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The Non-Option: Understanding the Dearth of 
Discounted Employee Stock Options 
 
  
Abstract 
 
U.S. companies are highly sensitive to the tax and accounting 
treatment of compensation arrangements.  For more than fifty 
years, congressional tax writers and the accounting profession 
have singled out discounted or “in-the-money” employee stock 
options, options with exercise prices less than the fair market 
value of the underlying stock at grant, for special, 
disadvantageous, treatment relative to non-discounted options.  
Today we observe no discounted options, but instead commonly 
observe a second best compensation solution – contemporaneous 
grants of both stock and non-discounted options to individual 
employees of U.S. public companies.   Given the ability to work 
around the barriers to explicit discounting in this fashion, this 
article explores whether the regulatory distinction between 
discounted and non-discounted options makes sense. 
The stated legislative rationales for rules discriminating 
against explicitly discounted options are weak, reflecting a 
dichotomous view of equity compensation divided between 
discounted and non-discounted options, when, in fact, option 
design is a continuum.  By contrast, this article sets forth a novel 
tax policy rationale for forcing firms to bifurcate in-the-money 
long-term incentive pay arrangements into discrete grants of stock 
and non-discounted options.  In short, doing so precludes the 
unwarranted expansion of preferential option tax treatment to 
deeply discounted options resembling stock.   
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 3
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 5 
II.  EQUITY COMPENSATION PRACTICE AND THEORY ..................................... 9 
A.  Equity Compensation Instruments ....................................................... 9 
B.  The Mix of Stock and Options in Executive Pay Packages ............... 11 
C.  Discounted Options from the Perspective of Finance Theory ........... 13 
1.  The Compensatory Stock Option Continuum ................................. 13 
2.  Optimal Compensation and Equity Pay Design .............................. 14 
III.  THE TAX AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF EQUITY COMPENSATION – 
ARE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DISCOUNTED AND NON-DISCOUNTED OPTIONS 
JUSTIFIED? .................................................................................................... 16 
A.  Tax and Accounting Treatment of Discounted and Non-Discounted 
Options ..................................................................................................... 17 
1.  IRC § 83 and Treasury Regulation 1.83-7 ...................................... 17 
2.  IRC § 409A ..................................................................................... 21 
3.  Statutory Stock Options .................................................................. 22 
4.  IRC § 162(m) .................................................................................. 23 
5.  Corporate Financial Accounting ..................................................... 24 
B.  Stated Rationales for the Disparate Treatment of Discounted Options 
are Unpersuasive ...................................................................................... 25 
1.  Corporate Financial Accounting ..................................................... 26 
2.  Statutory Stock Options .................................................................. 27 
3.  IRC § 162(m) .................................................................................. 29 
4.  IRC § 409A ..................................................................................... 31 
C. Tax Policy Rationales for Discouraging Firms from Granting 
Discounted Options .................................................................................. 31 
1.  Equity Compensation Can Be Tax Advantaged ............................. 32 
a.  Restricted Stock and NQSOs ...................................................... 32 
b.  ISOs............................................................................................. 34 
2.  Pre-Exercise Taxation of Options is Problematic .......................... 35 
a.  Pre-Exercise Taxation Based on the Fair Value of Options is 
Problematic ...................................................................................... 35 
b.  Pre-Exercise Taxation of Options Based on Intrinsic Value is 
Also Problematic .............................................................................. 37 
c.  Difficulty of Pre-Exercise Taxation Does Not Justify the ISO 
Regime ............................................................................................. 38 
3. Absent Special Tax/Accounting Rules, Firms Could Achieve 
NQSO/ISO Taxation on Instruments Resembling Restricted Stock .... 39 
4.  Expansion of NQSO/ISO Regimes to Include Stock Would Not 
Likely Be Catastrophic for the Public Fisc .......................................... 40 
a.  Restricted Stock Conversion into NQSOs .................................. 40 
b.  Restricted Stock Conversion into ISOs....................................... 41 
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 4
IV.  OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR TAX RULES DISCRIMINATING AGAINST 
DISCOUNTED OPTIONS .................................................................................. 43 
A.  Symbolic Legislation ......................................................................... 43 
B.  Avoiding an Actual Giveaway ........................................................... 44 
C.  Protecting Employees against Irrational Exuberance ......................... 44 
V.  THE EFFICIENCY COST OF DISTORTED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS 46 
A.  The Transmutability of Synthetic and Explicitly Discounted Options
.................................................................................................................. 47 
1.  The Economics of Synthetic and Explicitly Discounted Options ... 47 
2. Differences in Stock and Option Design that Affect Transmutability
.............................................................................................................. 50 
a.  The Timing of Stock Vesting and Option Exercise .................... 50 
b.  IRC § 83(b) Elections ................................................................. 51 
c.  Other Differences ........................................................................ 51 
3.  Employee Attitudes towards Explicit and Synthetic Discounted 
Options ................................................................................................. 52 
B. Would U.S. Firms Issue ITM Options but for the Tax and Accounting 
Rules Discouraging Them? ...................................................................... 52 
VI.  ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES ........................................................ 53 
A.  Bifurcating Discounted Options for Tax Purposes……………...…54 
B.  A More Lenient Bright Line Rule……………………….…….....…55 
VII.   CONCLUSION…………………………………………………..…...…55 
APPENDIX………………………………………………………....………..56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 5
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Corporate compensation arrangements are coming under increasing 
scrutiny.  Regulators are concerned not only with how much corporate 
executives and key employees are paid, but with how they are paid.1  
Effective regulation requires that we fully understand the driving forces 
behind firm choices regarding compensation.  When it comes to the 
design of equity compensation, two of the most important driving forces 
are tax and accounting rules.2 
For the last two decades, equity compensation has dominated high-
level pay in corporate America, and, until quite recently, stock options 
comprised the bulk of that equity pay.3  But these have not been just any 
stock options.  Almost all compensatory options issued by U.S. firms 
have been “at-the-money” options, options issued with an exercise price 
equal to the fair market value of the company’s stock on the date of the 
grant.  Discounted or “in-the-money” options, options with exercise 
prices less than the price of the underlying stock at grant, have been 
rarely observed, and today are never seen.  This is not a surprise.  For 
more than fifty years, congressional tax writers and the accounting 
profession have singled out discounted options for special, 
disadvantageous, treatment relative to non-discounted options.  The 
primary purpose of this article is to explore whether this persistent 
distinction makes sense.   
The short answer is yes, but not for the exact reasons that led to the 
rules discouraging discounted options in the first place.  This article 
argues that the distinctions the tax writers drew between these 
instruments, to the extent they can be discerned from the legislative 
histories, were misconceived, reflecting a false dichotomy between 
discounted and non-discounted options.  The accounting distinction, on 
the other hand, was based on a valid concern regarding valuation, a 
concern that I argue is more pressing in the tax sphere.  
Until about five years ago, the primary impediment to issuing 
discounted options was an accounting rule.  Under this rule, discounted 
options resulted in a charge against earnings; non-discounted options did 
                                                 
1 For a very timely example, note the requirement in the recent Wall Street 
bailout rules that, at companies receiving “exceptional” government aid, executive 
compensation in excess of $500,000 per year consist of restricted stock that will not 
become unrestricted or “vest” until the government loans are repaid.  See, e.g., Mark 
Maremont & Joann S. Lublin, Loopholes Sap Potency of Pay Limits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
6, 2009, at C1. 
2 See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY (3d 
ed. 2005). 
3 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 2485, 2515 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (discussing 
trends in CEO pay and the growing dominance of options in the 1990s); Brian J. Hall 
& Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 52 
(2003) (documenting the extensive use of options at “new economy” companies). 
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not.4  This rule was an unintended consequence of the accounting 
profession’s skepticism regarding the use of option pricing models to 
value compensatory options several decades ago.5  But this rule was 
revised in 2005, leveling the accounting playing field for options.   
However, just as the accounting distinction was being eliminated, 
the tax distinction became much more important.  Under new deferred 
compensation tax rules enacted in 2004 and codified in IRC § 409A, 
recipients of discounted options are taxed when their options become 
exercisable or “vest”, and they face an additional 20% penalty tax.  
Recipients of non-discounted options do not pay tax until they exercise 
their options and face no penalty tax.6  Section 409A effectively takes 
discounted options off the table at U.S. companies.  Why does § 409A 
contain this distinction?  The legislative history in this specific instance 
is silent, but the distinction has become routine in tax.  It dates back to 
the 1950s and is found in the current incentive stock option (ISO) rules7 
and the rules governing the deductibility of senior executive pay,8 in 
addition to § 409A.  The distinctions in the tax code appear to reflect a 
persistent misconception regarding stock options, an idea that 
discounted and non-discounted options are different in kind rather than 
simply different in degree.9   
By contrast, economists recognize that equity compensation 
instruments form a continuum ranging from zero strike price “options”, 
known to non-economists as restricted stock, to far out-of-the-money 
options.  Moreover, theorists have demonstrated that in many cases the 
best option design, from a standpoint of optimizing incentives and risk, 
would be a discounted option.10  However, given the rules discouraging 
                                                 
4 See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK 
ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES (1972) [hereinafter APB 25]; see also, infra Part III.A.5. 
5 See infra Part III.B.1.  In brief, the accounting professional did not believe 
that the fair value of options could be adequately valued.  Thus, APB 25 required that 
only the current, cash value, known as intrinsic value, existing at grant be expensed, 
which produced no accounting expense for non-discounted options that by definition 
have zero intrinsic value at grant. 
6 This tax regime applies only to non-statutory stock options.  As discussed 
infra Part III.A.3, some compensatory options qualify as incentive stock options (ISOs) 
under IRC §§ 421 & 422.  Taxation of ISO gains is deferred until the sale of the 
underlying shares and the gains are taxed at preferential rates.  Options that do not 
qualify as ISOs are known as non-qualified stock options (NQSOs) and are taxed as 
outlined here in accordance with IRC § 83 and Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7.  The large 
majority of options issued by U.S. firms are NQSOs.  See infra note 159. 
7 See IRC § 422(b)(4) (defining an ISO, inter alia, as an option with an 
exercise price not less than the fair market value of the employer’s stock at grant). 
8 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (creating a safe harbor for non-
discounted options only); see also infra Part III.A.4. 
9 For example, the legislative history behind the precursors to the ISO rules 
draw a false distinction between non-discounted options, which are viewed as creating 
incentives, and discounted options, which are viewed as compensatory.  In reality, all 
options include both incentive and compensation elements.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
10 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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explicitly discounted options we do not observe them.  However, what 
we do observe, increasingly, are grants of both non-discounted options 
and restricted stock to the same executives in the same year.  For 
example, of 200 large public company CEOs whose 2007 compensation 
was detailed by the New York Times in April 2008, 150 received stock 
grants within the fiscal year, 145 received non-discounted option grants, 
and 116 (58% of the total) received both.11   
The popularity of combinations of non-discounted options and stock, 
which I dub synthetic in-the-money options, is an important part of this 
analysis for two reasons.  First, it indicates that there is significant 
demand among U.S. companies for long-term equity pay packages that 
are effectively in the money.  This fact suggests that regulations 
discouraging (today effectively barring) firms from explicit discounting 
may be distorting compensation design and reducing the efficiency of 
pay packages.  On the other hand, if synthetic in-the-money options 
have properties that are very similar to explicitly discounted options, the 
ability to replicate explicit discounting through these combinations 
places a limit on the efficiency cost of the discriminatory rules.12   
In a latter part of this article, I explore the fungibility of explicit and 
synthetic discounted options.13  The bottom line is that the two are quite 
good, but not perfect substitutes.  This finding suggests that there 
probably is some efficiency loss in blocking the use of explicitly 
discounted options.  If there were no better justification than regulators’ 
discomfort with these instruments, I would argue for the elimination of 
the tax rules distinguishing between discounted and non-discounted 
options.  (Recall that the accounting playing field is now level.) 
However, there is a better justification that has not been discussed in 
the legislative history or in the academic literature, and it is a tax 
justification.  Although restricted stock and non-discounted options 
represent points along an economic continuum, they are not taxed 
consistently.  Restricted stock is generally taxed when it vests; non-
discounted options are taxed at exercise.14  Both tax regimes represent 
deviations from the ideal of grant-based or accrual taxation, but the 
                                                 
11 See Executive Pay: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, Sunday 
Business, at 10-11.  Stock grants include conventional time-vested restricted stock, 
performance-vested restricted stock, and performance shares, which are economically 
equivalent to performance-vested restricted stock.  Option grants include both 
conventional time-vested options and performance-vested options as well as stock 
appreciation rights (SARs).  These instruments are described more fully in Part II. 
12 At the limit, if explicit and synthetic ITM options are perfect substitutes, 
rules discouraging explicit discounting would not create inefficiencies. 
13 See infra Part V.  In essence, I assume that combinations of stock and non-
discounted options represent a second best compensation solution given obstacles to 
explicit discounting.  
14 See IRC § 83 and discussion Part III.A.1 infra.  I refer here to non-qualified 
stock options.  The difference between the taxation of restricted stock and ISOs is even 
greater and is discussed in Part III.A.3 infra. 
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option regime represents the greater deviation.15  Why do we allow 
optionees to defer tax until exercise?  The reason, I think, is pragmatic.  
Unlike publicly traded stock, options are difficult to value accurately 
prior to exercise and the valuations of options that are made for 
accounting and disclosure purposes are highly manipulable.16     
Suppose discounted options were treated for tax purposes just like 
non-discounted options.  Instead of granting restricted stock that would 
be taxed at vesting, firms could issue deeply discounted options that 
would be taxed at exercise, deferring all income from the pseudo-stock 
compensation until exercise.  One way to prevent that result would be to 
tax deeply discounted options like stock, instead of like non-discounted 
options, but the courts have declined to follow that approach.17  IRC 
§ 409A represents another solution, effectively preventing firms from 
granting options in the economic continuum between restricted stock 
and non-discounted options, forcing firms to bifurcate in-the-money pay 
packages into combinations of stock, taxed at vesting, and non-
discounted options, taxed at exercise.18  
In a sense, the accountants were right all along to be concerned 
about valuing compensatory options.  However, I believe their concern 
is more pressing in the realm of tax than accounting. 
But how important is the tax issue economically?  What would be 
the cost to the public fisc of permitting firms to issue explicitly 
discounted options taxed at exercise?  And how does this cost compare 
to the efficiency loss resulting from forcing firms to satisfy their demand 
for in-the-money pay packages with synthetic discounted options?  My 
suspicion is that the tax benefits of the status quo regime outweigh the 
efficiency costs, but this article can only address these questions 
qualitatively.  Its contribution lies in demonstrating that § 409A and the 
other tax and former accounting rules serendipitously serve(d) an 
important tax policy role in limiting the preferential option tax regimes 
                                                 
15 Although I do not intend to reopen the question of the tax advantage of 
equity compensation here, this article adds to a growing body of work on the 
economics of deferred and equity compensation taxation.  See Daniel I. Halperin, 
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of Money,” 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); 
David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 
(2004); Michael S. Knoll, The Tax-Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 TAX 
NOTES 203 (2004); Ethan Yale, Investment Risk is Important When Assessing the Tax 
Benefit of Deferred Compensation (Working Paper, 2007); Daniel Halperin & Ethan 
Yale, Deferred Compensation Revisited, x TAX NOTES 939 (2007). 
16 The vesting date valuation problem actually lies along a continuum as well.  
It is most severe for non-discounted options and becomes less and less acute as 
discounting increases, becoming negligible when one reaches restricted stock.  See 
infra Part III.C.2. 
17 See C.I.R. v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956) (respecting the option 
characterization of a discounted option); see also infra Part III.A.1. 
18 Of course, a third approach would involve fundamental reform of equity 
compensation taxation to achieve the accrual tax ideal.  Until that happy day arrives, 
however, there is merit in limiting the spread of the preferential option tax regimes to 
encompass deeply discounted options resembling restricted stock. 
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to the most deserving cases, non-discounted options that are difficult to 
value prior to exercise; in exploring the transmutability of explicit and 
synthetic in-the-money options; and in demonstrating the tension 
between the tax benefits and potential efficiency costs.19 
    
 
II.  EQUITY COMPENSATION PRACTICE AND THEORY 
 
 
 This article is concerned with equity compensation arrangements – 
devices that explicitly link compensation to share price performance 
with the intent, in most cases, of enhancing alignment between 
employee and shareholder interests and facilitating the recruitment and 
retention of key employees.  This part briefly reviews equity 
compensation practices at U.S. firms and some of the theory bearing on 
the use of equity pay.  It attempts to establish two points before 
undertaking the tax analysis in Part III.  First, firms demand in-the-
money (ITM) pay packages, a demand which at this point we will 
assume can be met with either discounted options or combinations of 
non-discounted options and stock.20  Second, use of ITM pay packages 
is consistent with finance theory. 
 
A.  Equity Compensation Instruments 
 
 Long-term equity pay arrangements are typically described as falling 
into one of two discrete categories – option-like instruments or deferred 
stock instruments.21  In the discussion that follows, “options” should 
be read to include conventional time-vested employee stock options;22 
                                                 
19 My analysis is related, but somewhat orthogonal to the literature on taxation 
and financial product innovation.  One theme of articles such as Alvin C. Warren, Jr., 
Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L.REV. 460 (1993) 
and Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. 
L.REV. 569 (1994) is that instruments that appear to be different, but aren’t, should be 
taxed in the same way to preclude arbitrage.  My project deals with a financial 
instrument, employee stock options, for which we have a special tax regime as a result 
of administrability concerns.  The goal here should be to prevent the spread of this 
preferential tax regime to instruments that appear to be similar, deeply discounted 
employee stock options, but that really aren’t, at least along the dimension that justifies 
the special tax regime. 
20 The transmutability of these instruments is explored in Part V.   
21 For a more detailed look at long-term executive incentive compensation 
practice at large U.S. public companies, see FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., THE 2007 
TOP 250: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES (2007). 
22 Employee stock options generally become exercisable, or vest, in 
installments, often ratably across the period beginning on the first anniversary of the 
grant and ending on the fourth anniversary of the grant.  See FREDERICK W. COOK, 
supra note 21, at 14 (providing data indicating vesting schedules of three to five years 
for 96% of the executive stock options analyzed).  If employment is terminated prior to 
vesting, options generally are forfeited. 
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performance-vested stock options, which add a performance criterion to 
vesting in addition to the traditional retention criterion;23 and stock 
appreciation rights (SARs), which are contracts that are economically 
equivalent to stock options.  Options, of course, provide the holder with 
a right, but no obligation, to purchase shares of stock at a pre-determined 
strike or exercise price.24  Thus, the defining feature of an option is that 
the payoff is based on the positive difference, if any, between the share 
price at exercise or settlement and the strike price of the instrument.  If 
the share price on a potential exercise date fails to exceed the strike 
price, the option provides zero payout.   
 As discussed below, the strike prices of almost all compensatory 
options issued by U.S. firms are set equal to the fair market value of the 
company’s stock on the date of the option grant.  This is known as an at-
the-money (ATM) option.  An option with a strike price less than fair 
market value at grant is a discounted or in-the-money (ITM) option.  An 
option with a strike price in excess of fair market value at grant is known 
as an out-of-the-money or, sometimes, a stretch option.  The positive 
difference at any time between the strike price and the value of the 
underlying stock is labeled the option’s intrinsic value, and the 
difference, positive or negative, is often referred to as moneyness.    
 In the deferred stock category, we observe conventional time-vested 
restricted stock that becomes nonforfeitable and unrestricted once a 
period of continued employment has passed;25 performance-vested 
restricted stock;26 and performance shares (fka phantom stock).  
Performance shares are economically equivalent to performance-vested 
restricted stock.27  Participants in performance share plans are entitled to 
                                                 
23 As an example, in 2007 the CEO of Home Depot received an option grant 
that does not vest unless the company’s share price exceeds the grant date price by 
25% for 30 consecutive trading days.  See Home Depot, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 
14A), at 32 (Apr. 11, 2008). 
24 The strike price of employee stock options is almost always a fixed price 
specified at grant.  A few firms have experimented with indexing strike prices to a 
basket of competing stocks or to a broad measure of the stock market, such as the S&P 
500, with the idea of focusing the option payout on firm-specific performance rather 
than market movements generally.  See Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to 
Link Executive Pay with Performance, HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 101 (Mar. – Apr. 1999).   
25 Restricted stock awards may vest in installments or “cliff vest” on a single 
date.  As in the case of options, most senior executive stock awards vest on a three to 
five year schedule.  See FREDERICK W. COOK, supra note 21, at 14. 
26 Performance-vested restricted stock is analogous to performance-vested 
options.  For example, in 2007, Moody’s granted restricted stock to senior executives 
that vests relatively slowly, or relatively quickly, depending on growth in the 
company’s annual operating income.  See Moody’s Corporation, Proxy Statement 
(Form DEF 14A), at 33-34 (Mar. 19, 2008). 
27 The difference between the two devices is that restricted stock is granted at 
the time of the award and is forfeited if the shares fail to vest, while performance 
shares are not issued until performance criteria are met.  But this difference is not 
significant economically. For example, under either type of plan, participants may be 
entitled to dividends. 
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receive shares (or the cash value equivalent) at the end of a specified 
period, often three years, but the number of shares actually delivered is a 
function of some measure of company performance, such as absolute or 
relative return on equity, earnings growth, etc.28  In the discussion that 
follows, restricted stock (performance-vested or conventional) and 
performance shares will be referred to as deferred stock, restricted stock, 
or sometimes simply stock.29   
 
B.  The Mix of Stock and Options in Executive Pay Packages 
 
 This article is not concerned solely with executive compensation, but 
as a result of the SEC’s proxy disclosure rules, we have much more 
information on senior executive pay than we have on the pay of junior 
executives and rank and file employees.  Moreover, while senior 
executives generally receive more equity pay than other employees and 
while equity pay usually constitutes a larger fraction of executive pay 
packages,30 option moneyness and other design features tend to be 
consistent through the ranks.  Thus, this section describes executive 
equity pay practice both as a matter of independent interest and as a 
proxy for corporate equity pay practices generally. 
  Explicitly discounted employee stock options have been rare 
historically and have recently disappeared entirely.  In a study of options 
granted to CEOs of 1000 companies in 1992, Kevin Murphy found that 
only 3% were issued in the money.31  In its most recent study of 
compensation practices at the 250 largest companies included in the 
S&P 500 Index, Frederick W. Cook & Co. found no instances of 
discounted options.32  While a few firms issue out-of-the-money options, 
almost all executive options are issued at the money.33 
 However, contrasted with the lack of diversity in option moneyness 
is an increasing diversity in the mix of stock and options granted to 
executives, which yields a broad diversity in the effective moneyness of 
                                                 
28 Northern Trust Corporation’s fiscal year 2007 performance share awards 
are typical.  Each participant was assigned a target number of shares.  If the company 
achieves average three year earnings per share (EPS) growth of 10%, 100% of the 
target shares will vest at the end of three years.  If EPS growth is between 8% and 
10%, a fraction of the shares will vest.  If EPS growth exceeds 10%, a multiple of 
target shares, up to 125% at 12% average EPS growth, will vest.  See Northern Trust 
Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 46 (Apr. 15, 2008). 
29 Public companies rarely issue unrestricted stock to their employees.   
30 Professor Murphy provides data demonstrating that CEOs receive a greater 
fraction of their pay in the form of equity compensation than do subordinate 
executives.  See Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms, 34 J. 
ACCT. & FIN. 129, 132 (2003).  Although similar data is not available for rank and file 
employees, it is widely recognized that the trend generally continues as one moves 
downward through the ranks.  
31 See Murphy, supra note 3, at 2509. 
32 See FREDERICK W. COOK, supra note 21, at 6. 
33 See id. at 6, 7; Murphy, supra note 3 at 2509. 
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 12
equity compensation.  Executive equity pay in the late 1990s was 
dominated by options, with stock grants playing a relatively modest role, 
but recent data indicates the growing importance of stock grants.34 
 Equity pay received by the top five executives of S&P 500 
companies in 2006 is portrayed in Figure 1 below.35  Each observation 
represents one executive, and the vertical axis indicates the fraction of 
equity pay consisting of stock and options by ex ante value.  18% of 
these executives received a conventional option, a performance-vested 
option or an SAR grant in 2006, but received no stock grant.  21% 
received conventional time-vested restricted stock, performance-vested 
restricted stock, or performance shares, but received no option grant.  
Strikingly, however, 51% of the executives received both a stock and an 
option grant in 2006, generating pay packages that were effectively in 
the money.  10% of the executives received no equity compensation 
grants during the fiscal year.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
34 See David I. Walker, The Evolving Composition of Executive Equity 
Compensation: Theory and Evidence 13 (Working Paper, Jan. 2009) (documenting a 
shift from an aggregate ratio of option to stock compensation for S&P 500 executives 
of more than 4 to 1 in the late 1990s to about a 3 to 2 ratio in favor of stock in 2006 and 
2007).  
35 The source of this data is Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, which 
extracts data from corporate proxy filings.  Generally, firms report compensation data 
for five executives.  However, in some cases data is supplied and coded by Compustat 
for a greater or lesser number of executives. 
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 The economic correspondence between 1) grants of both stock and 
non-discounted options and 2) grants of explicitly discounted options is 
important in evaluating the efficiency cost of rules discouraging the 
latter.  This correspondence is explored in detail in Part V below.  The 
take-away point here, however, is that, although explicitly discounted 
options are off the table, many U.S. executives are receiving equity pay 
packages that are effectively in the money. 
 
C.  Discounted Options from the Perspective of Finance Theory 
 
The empirical data reviewed in the previous section are consistent 
with corporate finance theory.  Finance theory teaches that 1) deferred 
stock and option compensation actually represent points along an 
economic continuum and 2) in some situations, optimal equity 
compensation would consist of discounted options, or combinations of 
stock and non-discounted options.  This section briefly reviews the 
relevant theory.   
 
1.  The Compensatory Stock Option Continuum 
 
Although practitioners, commentators, and regulators tend to think 
of equity pay as being neatly divided into stock and options, it is widely 
recognized in the corporate finance literature that traditional time-vested 
restricted stock is equivalent to an option with a zero exercise price and 
that equity compensation can be viewed as a continuum running from 
restricted stock to far out-of-the-money options.36  The option 
continuum is portrayed in the following figure.   
 
 
Figure 2 
The Compensatory Stock Option Continuum 
 
 
Option                     
Exercise               <100% of 100% of        >100% of 
Price:          Zero      grant fmv grant fmv              grant fmv 
             ____________________________________________________>     
 
Usual      Restricted             In-the-          At-the-         Out-of- 
Label:         Stock       money          money         the-money 
          option          option         option 
 
 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Oded Palmon et al., Optimal Strike Prices of Stock Options for 
Effort-Averse Executives, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 229, 230 (2008) at 230; Gerald A. 
Feltham & Martin G.H. Wu, Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options, 6 REV. 
ACCT. STUD. 7, 8 (2001). 
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 Absent tax and accounting concerns, finance theory suggests that 
firms wishing to compensate employees with equity pay would select 
the optimal point along the continuum to minimize agency costs and 
maximize profits.37 
 
2.  Optimal Compensation and Equity Pay Design 
 
 Equity pay packages are designed to provide both compensation and 
incentives, and optimizing the design of equity pay involves a tradeoff.  
On the one hand, firms want to provide high-powered incentives to 
encourage employees to work hard and to take on risky projects.38  As 
one moves to the right along the continuum portrayed in Figure 2, the 
sensitivity of pay to stock price performance increases and the incentives 
become more high-powered.39  On the other hand, pay packages have to 
be mutually acceptable, and employees, who cannot easily diversify, 
apply large discounts to high-powered incentive arrangements that 
provide very risky pay, creating a gap between the cost of such pay 
arrangements to shareholders and their value to employees.40  The 
optimal pay arrangement balances incentive generation with risk bearing 
costs.   
 The optimal design of these contracts has been studied extensively 
by corporate finance researchers.41  The following description barely 
scratches the surface of this literature but should be sufficient for placing 
the material that follows in context.42  
                                                 
37 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976) (classic exposition of agency costs in the firm setting). 
38 Executives and other employees, whose financial and human capital 
generally is over-invested in their companies, tend to disfavor risky projects relative to 
diversified shareholders.  See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-based 
Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 21, 29 (2003). 
39 The sensitivity of option value to stock price movements is denoted as 
option delta.  The effect of moneyness on option delta will be explored in greater detail 
in Part V. 
40 See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified 
Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 5 (2002). 
41 Although this section considers equity compensation within an optimal 
contracting framework, it should be noted that there are other possible explanations for 
the prevalence of equity-based pay in the U.S. executive suite, including the accounting 
preference for ATM options discussed infra Part III.A.5, as well as 
competing/complementary theories of how executive pay arrangements are determined.  
See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (proposing a managerial 
power theory of the executive pay setting process); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004) (same). 
42 For a fairly recent overview of the finance literature on equity compensation 
within an optimal contracting framework, see John E. Core et al, Executive Equity 
Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27. 
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 Ideally, employee, firm, and market characteristics should all be 
considered in determining the optimal moneyness of equity 
compensation.  Numerous employee characteristics have been modeled 
by finance theorists, but risk aversion appears to be the most important, 
and certainly the most frequently modeled, individual trait.43  A highly 
risk averse optionee will more greatly discount options with more 
remote payoff prospects.  Thus, as risk aversion increases, the optimal 
design shifts in the direction of stock.44  Firm characteristics that have 
been modeled revolve around the firm’s opportunity set, the marginal 
productivity of effort,45 desired riskiness of projects,46 and leverage.47  
Firm leverage, for example, should be positively correlated with 
moneyness, as, all else being equal, increased leverage increases the risk 
of the option contract.48  The overall market environment affects optimal 
exercise prices in a similar fashion, i.e., market volatility should be 
positively correlated with moneyness.49 
 Depending on firm and employee characteristics (and on model 
specifications), researchers have concluded that the optimal equity 
compensation design ranges from far in-the-money options (i.e., 
                                                 
43 Studies examining risk aversion alone or in combination with other factors 
include Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock 
Options, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2000); Hall & Murphy, supra note 40; Yisong S. 
Tian, Too Much of a Good Incentive? The Case of Executive Stock Options, 28 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1255 (2004) [hereinafter Tian (2004)]; Yisong S. Tian, Optimal 
Contracting, Incentive Effects and the Valuation of Executive Stock Options (Working 
Paper, Apr. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Tian (2001)]; Richard A. Lambert & David F. 
Larcker, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, and Incentives 23 (Working Paper, 2004), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=527822; Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug, Lower 
Salaries and No Options? On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay, 62 J. FIN. 303, 
308 (2007); Feltham & Wu, supra note 36, at 6.   
Other characteristics that have been modeled include loss aversion, effort 
aversion, overall wealth, firm equity held, and outside investment opportunities.  See, 
e.g., Anna Dodonova & Yuri Khoroshilov, Optimal Incentive Contracts for Loss-
Averse Managers: Stock Options versus Restricted Stock Grants, 41 FIN. REV. 451 
(2006) (loss aversion); Palmon et al., supra note 36, at 230 (effort aversion); Tian 
(2001), supra note 43 at 40 (effort aversion, overall wealth, firm equity held, and 
outside investment opportunities); Dittmann & Maug, supra note 43, at 308 (effort 
aversion); Feltham & Wu, supra note 36, at 6 (effort aversion).  
44 See, e.g., Tian (2001), supra note 43, at 32;  See also Hall, supra note 38, at 
31 (noting that under plausible assumptions, the “value-to-cost discount for stock is 
two to three times less than that of” ATM options). 
45 See, e.g., Lambert & Larcker, supra note 43, at 3.  
46 See, e.g., Chongwoo Choe, Leverage, Volatility and Executive Stock 
Options, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 591, 593 (2003) [hereinafter Choe (2003)]; Chongwoo Choe, 
Maturity and Exercise Price of Executive Stock Options, 10 REV. FIN. ECON. 227, 229 
(2001) [hereinafter Choe (2001)]. 
47 See, e.g., Choe (2003), supra note 46, at 593; Choe (2001), supra note 46, 
at 229. 
48 See, e.g., Choe (2003), supra note 46, at 593. 
49 See Lambert & Larcker, supra note 43, at 3. 
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restricted stock) to far out-of-the-money options.50  Many studies have 
concluded, however, that within a certain range of assumptions, in-the-
money options with positive exercise prices would be optimal.51  These 
studies suggest that the ITM pay packages documented in the previous 
section are not accidental. 
  
  
III.  THE TAX AND ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF EQUITY COMPENSATION 
– ARE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DISCOUNTED AND NON-DISCOUNTED 
OPTIONS JUSTIFIED? 
 
 
 This part analyses the disparate tax and financial accounting 
treatment of discounted options and is the core of the article.  Given its 
length, it may be helpful to begin with a preview and a roadmap.  As a 
further aid, the tax treatment of equity compensation is summarized in a 
table in the appendix. 
 The fundamental tax rules regarding equity compensation – IRC 
§ 83 and the § 83-7 Treasury Regulations – and the case law make no 
distinction between discounted and non-discounted options.  The same is 
true of the current financial accounting rules applicable to U.S. public 
corporations.  However, as Section A of this part describes, several 
specific tax rules, including the recently promulgated rules and 
regulations under IRC § 409A, do distinguish between discounted and 
non-discounted options, as did the accounting rules in force prior to 
2005.  These specific rules arguably have distorted compensation 
design, blocking the use of explicit ITM options and channeling equity 
compensation into the distinct streams documented in Part II – stock 
grants and ATM options.   
 There is no suggestion in the legislative history that this result was 
achieved by design, and, as Section B describes, the stated rationales in 
the regulatory histories for the rules restricting option discounting reflect 
a false dichotomy between discounted and non-discounted options.   
 Although the stated rationales are unpersuasive, one can argue that 
rules discouraging grants of discounted options represent good tax 
                                                 
50 Compare Hall & Murphy, supra note 40, at 26-27 (concluding that “when 
existing compensation is adjusted, incentives are maximized through restricted stock 
grants rather than options”) and Dittmann & Maug, supra note 43, at 305 (reporting 
results of a model indicating that CEOs should receive restricted stock instead of 
options) with Lambert & Larcker, supra note 43, at 2 (“exercise price in the optimal 
contract is frequently far ‘out of the money’”). 
51 See Tian (2004), supra note 43, at 1227 (“incentive-maximizing exercise 
price is typically greater than zero but less than the stock price”); Palmon et al., supra 
note 36, at 230-231 (simulations suggest that options are optimally granted in the 
money); Tian (2001), supra note 43, at 32 (arguing that the optimal option design 
ranges from at the money to deep in the money, i.e., restricted stock, depending on 
degree of risk aversion). 
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policy nonetheless, in that they prevent unwarranted expansion of the 
non-qualified stock option (NQSO) and incentive stock option (ISO) tax 
regimes in the direction of restricted stock.52  Section C lays out the 
argument. 
 In brief, the NQSO story is as follows:  Under current law, equity 
compensation can be tax advantaged versus the accrual or cash 
compensation ideal.  The tax advantage arises from the deferral of tax 
and increases with the period of deferral.  For stock grants, tax is 
deferred until vesting; for NQSOs, deferral extends to exercise.  
Arguably, deferral of NQSO taxation beyond vesting is a pragmatic 
response to the difficulty of valuing option compensation prior to 
exercise and the potential that such valuations would be manipulated in 
self-serving ways.  Taxation of stock grants at vesting raises no 
valuation or manipulation issues (at least with respect to public company 
issuers).  Absent rules such as § 409A, firms could achieve more 
favorable NQSO taxation on instruments resembling restricted stock by 
issuing deeply discounted options instead.  The crux of this argument is 
that the NQSO rules reflect a pragmatic accommodation for options that 
should not be extended to stock. 
 A similar story could be told about preserving the sanctity of the ISO 
rules, but in my view the ISO regime is less defensible than the NQSO 
regime to begin with.  Thus, any expansion of the ISO regime would be 
regrettable in my view. 
 Finally, in Section C.4, I consider the qualitative impact of 
expanding the NQSO and ISO regimes to include deeply discounted 
options under current law. 
 
A.  Tax and Accounting Treatment of Discounted and Non-Discounted 
Options 
 
 The primary aim of this section is to document the disparate 
treatment of discounted options under the Internal Revenue Code and 
under pre-2005 GAAP.  However, the taxation of restricted stock will 
become important later in the analysis.  Thus, this section begins by 
describing the taxation of both stock and options under IRC § 83 and the 
§ 1.83-7 regulations.  As will be evident, these provisions, as well as 
§ 409A, are aimed at reaching the appropriate tax result for 
compensation.  The other tax provisions that I will discuss – § 162(m) 
and the ISO rules – serve other aims, at least in part.  The accounting 
rules are intended to determine the appropriate amount and timing of 
book expense recognition related to equity compensation. 
 
1.  IRC § 83 and Treasury Regulation 1.83-7 
                                                 
52 As discussed infra Part III.A.3, options qualifying as incentive stock options 
are afforded special, employee favorable, tax treatment.  Options that do not qualify 
and are not taxed as ISOs are known as non-qualified stock options. 
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 The starting point for analysis of the taxation of equity compensation 
is IRC § 83.  That section provides that the value of property received in 
exchange for performance of services is includable in income when the 
property is transferable or no longer subject to a substantial risk of 
forfeiture.53  In the absence of a taxpayer election under IRC § 83(b),54 
the application of § 83 to restricted stock is straightforward.  Recipients 
of restricted stock are taxed, at ordinary income rates, on the value of 
their shares (less any amount paid for them) at vesting, i.e., when the 
shares are no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.55  The 
employer is entitled to a corresponding and contemporaneous 
deduction.56   
 Per IRC § 83 and Treasury Regulation § 1.83-7, recipients of 
NQSOs typically are taxed on the intrinsic value or option “spread” at 
exercise at ordinary income tax rates.57  The employer, again, is entitled 
to a corresponding and contemporaneous deduction.58  Option taxation is 
deferred until exercise even if the instrument vests at grant or vests in 
the interim between grant and exercise.  Compared with stock awards, 
options permit employees to defer taxation beyond vesting and to 
control the timing of realization, between the contractual bounds of 
vesting and expiration. 
 IRC § 83 and Regulation § 1.83-7 make no distinction between 
discounted and non-discounted options.  NQSO taxation occurs at 
exercise unless the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value 
(RAFMV) at the time of grant, in which case it would be taxed at 
grant.59  Unless the option is actively traded on an established market 
(for employee stock options virtually a null set), an option has a 
RAFMV at grant only if the option is transferable, the option is 
immediately exercisable, neither the option nor the underlying stock is 
subject to any other significant restrictions, and the option value is 
                                                 
53 IRC § 83(a). 
54 If an election is made under IRC § 83(b), the fair market value of the 
property at grant, ignoring any restrictions that will lapse, over the amount paid, if any, 
is included in income in the year of the transfer. 
55 Taxation occurs at vesting even if the shares are subject to a further 
contractual restriction on transfer.  Under the Treasury Regulations, restricted property 
becomes includable in income when it becomes transferable or is no longer subject to a 
substantial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs first.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) & -
3(b).  See also Sakol v. C.I.R., 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting constitutional 
challenge to the application of § 83 to include full restricted stock gain at vesting in 
income despite restriction on transfer that continued for several years).  However, if the 
sale of vested shares would trigger § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, taxation is 
deferred until that restriction is lifted.  See IRC § 83(c)(3). 
56 IRC § 83(h).  The taxation of performance shares is analogous. 
57 Recall that intrinsic value or spread at any time is the difference between 
the fair market value of the underlying stock and the option’s exercise price. 
58 IRC § 83(h). 
59 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a). 
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readily ascertainable.60  Needless to say, few employee options meet all 
of these tests and are taxable at grant.  Moreover, even if a discounted 
option met the first three tests, the fact that it was granted in the money 
would not necessarily mean that it had a RAFMV.  As the regulations 
note, the total value of an option at any time includes both its intrinsic 
value and the value of the option privilege – the opportunity to benefit 
from further increases in stock price without risking capital.61 
 Although § 83 and the regulations fail to distinguish between 
discounted and non-discounted options, it is possible that a court might 
disregard the option label applied to a deeply discounted NQSO, treating 
the instrument as restricted stock, which would result in taxation at 
vesting.  However, there is considerable judicial authority, going back at 
least to LoBue,62 respecting the option characterization and taxing 
discounted options at exercise.   
 Philip LoBue received discounted options on his employer’s stock in 
the 1940s.63  In litigation pre-dating the promulgation of IRC § 83, the 
Tax Court concluded that the options were non-compensatory and that 
the stock would be taxed like any other arm’s length bargain purchase, 
i.e., LoBue would take a cost basis in the shares purchased through 
exercise of the options and recognize gains when the shares were 
ultimately sold.64  The Supreme Court reversed but was split on the 
appropriate treatment.  In dissent, Justice Harlan (joined by Justice 
Burton) argued that it was appropriate to tax LoBue on the option spread 
at grant, for the options that vested immediately and otherwise on the 
spread existing at vesting.65  Under Harlan’s scheme, presumably, the 
grant/vesting date spread would also be treated as basis; exercise would 
not be a taxable event; but the amount paid to exercise the option would 
be added to cost basis.66 
                                                 
60 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(2).  See also, Cramer v. C.I.R., 64 F.3d 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (rejecting challenge to the 1.83-7(b)(2) regulation as an invalid 
interpretation of IRC § 83). 
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(b)(3). 
62 C.I.R. v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956). 
63 Reportedly, the exercise prices on some of LoBue’s options were about 
25% of the grant date fair market value of the underlying stock, i.e., those options were 
about 75% in the money at grant.  See Judith E. Alden & Murray S. Akresh, Using 
Equity to Compensate Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 67, 188 (Yale D. 
Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds., 2002). 
64 See LoBue, 351 U.S. at 245-46. 
65 See id. at 250-52.  
66  See id. at 252 (Harlan J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating 
“I would hold the granting [/vesting] of the options to be the taxable event and would 
measure the income by the value of the options when granted.”) 
Justice Harlan is not explicit, but his analysis implies that the intrinsic value or 
spread of the option at vesting would be the measure of compensation taxable as 
ordinary income.  If so, his approach would mirror that of the ISO rules discussed 
below.  For example, suppose a firm issues an at-the-money option that vests 
immediately.  Under Harlan’s approach, the recipient would have zero compensation 
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 The LoBue majority followed the Treasury’s practice of taxing 
compensatory options at exercise, consistent with other bargain 
purchases in the employment context.67  The majority noted that an 
option that had a RAFMV at grant, was transferable at grant, and 
(implicitly) was immediately exercisable, might result in grant date 
taxation, but those were not the facts of LoBue.68 
 In the years since LoBue, its approach has been adopted by the 
Treasury in its regulations,69 and courts have followed quite literally, 
even in cases in which options were deeply discounted.70  Cases in 
which grant date taxation has been imposed are rare, but not non-
existent.  In Morrison v. CIR,71 the Tax Court followed the regulations 
in holding that the receipt of an option was a taxable event.  The option 
in that case was freely transferable and immediately exercisable, and 
neither the option nor the underlying stock was subject to significant 
restrictions.72 Moreover, because the fair market value of the underlying 
stock at grant was $300/share and the option carried a $1/share exercise 
price, the court concluded that the option had a RAFMV, i.e., $299.73   
 Modestly, the court in Morrison respected the option 
characterization, but found that grant date taxation was dictated under 
the regulations.  Arguably, the court could have reached the same result 
by disregarding the option characterization and considering the 
transaction effectively a grant of stock, taxable under the general rule of 
§ 83.  Given the precedents, however, it seems unlikely that a court 
                                                                                                                            
income (and hence the firm would have zero deduction); the employee would have 
zero basis prior to exercise; and the entire gain would be treated as capital gain. 
67 See id. at 249.  The Treasury’s general approach to compensatory bargain 
purchases goes back at least to 1923.  See T.D. 3435, 1923-1 C.B. 50.  However, that 
approach was not as uniform as the LoBue opinion suggests.  See LoBue, 351 U.S. at 
249 (“uniform Treasury practice since 1923 has been to measure the compensation … 
at the time the option is exercised”).  Prior to 1950, in response to conflicting judicial 
decisions, the Treasury had twice reversed its position on the taxation of stock options 
and thus returned to exercise date taxation.  See President’s 1963 Tax Message: 
Hearings before the H.  Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong. 463 (1963) 
[hereinafter President’s 1963 Tax Message] (testimony of Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, 
Secretary of the Treasury) (providing a succinct history). 
68 See LoBue, 351 U.S. at 249.   
69 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7; see also John L. Utz, Tax Mgmt. (BNA), 
Nonstatutory Stock Options A-8,9 (2001) (noting that LoBue “provided the 
framework” for the regulations, which, in addition, adopted the Court’s “readily 
ascertainable market value” phrasing). 
70 See, e.g., Graney v. U.S., 258 F.Supp. 383 (S.D. W .Va. 1966) (respecting 
option characterization of employee’s right to purchase stock for $25/share granted 
when the underlying stock was valued at $75/share); Victorson v. CIR, 326 F.2d 264 
(2d Cir. 1964) (upholding option characterization of underwriters’ right to purchase for 
$0.001/share stock otherwise sold in a public offering at $0.50/share).  To be sure, in 
each of these cases, the taxpayer was arguing ex post against its own ex ante option 
characterization. 
71 59 T.C. 248 (1972). 
72 Id. at 260. 
73 Id. at 261. 
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would disregard option characterization unless the instrument was so 
deeply discounted as to be effectively equivalent to a grant of stock, and 
perhaps not even then.74 
 
2.  IRC § 409A 
 
 IRC § 409A, enacted in 2004, modifies the tax treatment of 
discounted employee stock options in a fundamental way.  Under 
§ 409A, vested deferred compensation (defined broadly) that runs afoul 
of certain requirements is currently includable in income and subject to 
an additional 20% penalty tax.75 Congress enacted § 409A in an effort to 
combat what it viewed as improper deferrals of income for tax purposes, 
principally arrangements that provided individuals with security of 
future payment (such as offshore rabbi trusts) and/or sufficient control to 
allow them to minimize the risk of nonpayment (such as provisions 
permitting early withdrawal of deferred compensation with a penalty or 
“haircut”).76   
   Although restricted stock and options could be viewed as providing 
for deferral of compensation, and hence as subject to § 409A, the 
regulations provide safe harbors for both instruments.77  However, the 
option safe harbor is narrowly drawn to exclude discounted options.78  
As a result, while the provision has no affect on income inclusion 
                                                 
74 At one time, at least, the IRS was more concerned than the courts about the 
taxation of deeply discounted options.  See Rev. Proc. 89-22, 1989-1 C.B. 843 (as 
amended by Announcement 89-42, 1989-13 I.R.B. 53) (announcing discounted options 
as a topic of study and suspending advance rulings pending published guidance).   
However, no published guidance was issued. 
75 See IRC § 409A(a).  
Section 409A has been a source of great consternation for the corporate bar.  
The cost of non-compliance is large, and the regulations implementing the provision 
are so extraordinarily detailed and complex that they ultimately “fail to provide 
effective guidance.”  Michael Doran, Time to Start Over on Deferred Compensation, 
118 TAX NOTES 1311, 1313 (2008) (recommending that the existing § 409A 
regulations be withdrawn and replaced with more focused guidance). 
76 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-658 (2008) (modifying § 409A and discussing its 
purposes).  Rabbi trusts (so named for an early beneficiary) are designed to facilitate 
deferral of tax on deferred compensation.  A trust, when made irrevocable, provides 
protection to the participant by placing deferred compensation assets beyond the reach 
of an employer, but in order to avoid immediate taxation, those assets must remain 
subject to the claims of the employer’s general creditors.  See Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 
C.B. 422.  Rabbi trusts were moved offshore in an attempt to maintain nominal creditor 
access while making discovery and actual access more difficult.  With limited 
exceptions, the new rules make offshore rabbi trust assets immediately taxable. 
77 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A) & 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i).  There is no 
safe harbor, as such, for performance shares, but no income is includable under § 409A 
until the income is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.  As long as 
income inclusion under a performance share plan occurs at the time that the 
performance conditions are satisfied and the shares are delivered to the employee, these 
plans do not present a concern under § 409A. 
78 See id. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A)(1).  
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associated with non-discounted options, under § 409A compensation 
arising from conventional discounted options would be included at 
vesting and subjected to a 20% penalty tax, regardless of when the 
options are ultimately exercised.79     
 Of all the tax and accounting rules this article considers, § 409A is 
probably the measure that most strongly discourages explicit grants of 
ITM options.80  Section 409A essentially compels firms wishing to 
create in-the-money equity pay packages to bifurcate these packages 
into grants of stock and non-discounted options.    
 
3.  Statutory Stock Options 
 
 If holding period requirements are met, recipients of incentive stock 
options (ISOs) incur no regular income tax obligation at exercise, but 
instead pay tax at capital gains rates on gains from ISO transactions 
when they sell the underlying shares.81  From the recipient’s point of 
                                                 
79 Under § 409A, discounted options are considered deferred compensation.  
See id. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(C).  Plans providing conventional discounted options do 
not comply with the provisions of § 409A because the holder controls the timing of 
realization.  See IRC § 409A(a)(2) (listing permissible plan distribution events as 
including only termination, death, disability, a predetermined fixed date, change in 
control, and unforeseeable emergency).  As a result, compensation arising from 
conventional discounted options would be includable when the income is no longer 
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, i.e., at vesting.  See id. § 409A(a)(1)(A).  And 
the penalty tax would apply.  See id. § 409A(a)(1)(B).  The measure of compensation is 
not specified in the statute and regulations on this point have not been promulgated, but 
presumably some measure of fair value at vesting would be employed. 
Of course, another way of avoiding the harsh consequences arising from 
option discounting under § 409A would be to eliminate employee discretion over 
exercise timing.  A European option that was exercised on a fixed date, say ten years 
from grant, would presumably satisfy § 409A and avoid accelerated taxation.  Given 
the loss of discretion, however, it seems likely that employees would greatly discount 
European options.   
80 See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., supra note 21, at 6 (stating that “[d]iscount 
stock options have disappeared because there are adverse tax consequences under the 
new deferred compensation rules (IRC Section 409A)”). 
81 See IRC § 421(a).  This description assumes, of course, that the employee 
enjoys a gain.  Unlike NQSO transactions, ISO transactions can result in losses, which 
are treated as capital losses.   
Note that no gain goes untaxed under the ISO rules.  The employee-level tax 
advantage versus NQSOs arises from conversion of ordinary income into capital gain.  
Assume, for example, that an option has a $100/share strike price, that the shares are 
worth $300 each at exercise, and that the stock is ultimately sold for $600/share.  If an 
NQSO, the employee would recognize $200/share ordinary compensation income at 
exercise and $300/share capital gain on sale of the stock.  If an ISO, the entire 
$500/share gain would be capital gain.  The ISO regime also permits deferral of tax on 
options beyond exercise to the sale of the underlying shares, but this is only 
advantageous if option expiration is approaching and the optionee has a non-tax reason 
for holding the underlying shares post-exercise, such as minimum stock ownership 
guidelines. Note, however, that the spread on an ISO at exercise (the difference 
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view, this tax treatment beats that of NQSOs – the employee is able to 
defer tax beyond exercise and pay tax at what have generally been 
reduced capital gains rates.  The employer, however, is not entitled to a 
tax deduction for an ISO and, thus, ISOs are not necessarily tax 
advantaged from a global (i.e., employee plus employer) tax 
perspective.82  In fact, at current top marginal individual and corporate 
tax rates, ISOs are inferior to NQSOs from a global tax perspective.83  
However, if a firm faces a low effective marginal tax rate, perhaps 
because of accumulated losses, ISOs can be tax advantaged, and we 
often see start-up firms employing ISOs.84 
 There are a number of rules that restrict the use of ISOs.  One of 
these rules is that the exercise price of an ISO cannot be less than the 
fair market value of the underlying stock on the date of the grant.85  In 
other words, ISOs cannot be granted in the money.   
 
4.  IRC § 162(m) 
 
 IRC § 162(m) limits public company tax deductions for certain 
senior executive compensation to $1 million per executive per year.86  
However, the statute provides an exception for performance-based pay, 
which is fully deductible.  Generally, in order to qualify as performance 
based, an element of compensation must be payable solely as a result of 
the attainment of performance goals that are pre-established by an 
independent committee of outside directors, are included in a 
shareholder approved plan, and are certified as having been satisfied by 
the independent committee.87   
 However, the regulations provide a safe harbor for stock options that 
deems options to be performance based if granted by the firm’s 
compensation committee in accordance with a plan meeting certain 
                                                                                                                            
between the then fair market value of the shares and the exercise price) is an 
adjustment for purposes of computing alternative minimum tax.  See id. § 56(b)(3). 
82 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 2, at 229.  
83 Id. 
84 Id.   
85 See IRC § 422(b)(4).  In addition, recipients must be employees and hold 
less than 10% of the company’s shares, expiration cannot exceed ten years, and the 
option must be issued under a shareholder approved plan.  Also, the size of annual ISO 
grants to particular employees is limited. 
86 IRC § 162(m)(1)-(3).  Generally, § 162(m) applies to the compensation of a 
company’s CEO plus the four most highly compensated executives other than the 
CEO.   
Financial institutions participating in various aspects of the 2008 financial 
rescue effort face even more stringent limits on deductibility of senior executive pay.  
Firms affected may deduct no more than $500,000 of compensation per executive per 
year and there are no exceptions for performance-based pay.  See Treasury Announces 
Executive Compensation Rules Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury Press Release, Oct. 14, 2008.    
87 IRC § 162(m)(4)(C). 
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minimal requirements.88  But there is another potential bar to reaching 
the safe harbor – the option may not be granted in the money.89  To be 
sure, this does not mean that ITM options and restricted stock cannot 
qualify as deductible performance-based pay, only that, in order to 
qualify, discounted options and stock must be subjected to specific 
performance criteria, whereas non-discounted options essentially qualify 
automatically.90 
 To this extent, then, the contours of the § 162(m) safe harbor 
discourage the issuance of explicitly discounted options to senior 
executives.  However, the effect of § 162(m) on discounted options 
should not be overstated.  Today, given § 409A, discounted options are 
off the table in any event.  Nonetheless, § 162(m) clearly represents 
another instance of tax rules discriminating against discounted options.   
 
5.  Corporate Financial Accounting 
 
 Prior to 2005, financial accounting for equity compensation was 
controlled by a standard issued in 1972 by the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB), a regulator that predated the present Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB).91  Under the 1972 standard, firms were 
required to recognize as compensation expense the intrinsic value of an 
option on the date of grant.92  That expense was accrued ratably over the 
option vesting period, and at that point the books on the option were 
closed.93  There was no requirement to update the expense as the 
intrinsic value of the option fluctuated over time.  As a result, no 
expense was recorded at any point for non-discounted options, because, 
by definition, these options had zero intrinsic value on the date of 
grant.94 
 Although the intrinsic value method of accounting for option 
expense was inadequate, unlike some of the tax rules we have seen, it 
                                                 
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi). 
89 Id. 
90 IRC § 162(m) partially explains the increasing popularity of performance 
shares.  As noted, these instruments are economically equivalent to performance vested 
restricted stock and, although they do not fall within a safe harbor, they are easily 
qualified as performance based within the regulations.   
91 See APB 25, supra note 4.  The relevant substance of APB 25 actually 
originated in an Accounting Research Bulletin issued in 1953.  See infra notes 100-103 
and accompanying text. 
92 See APB 25, supra note 4, para. 10. 
93 See id. para. 12.  
94 The FASB attempted to rationalize equity compensation accounting in the 
1990s, but they only succeeded in implementing an elective regime that effectively left 
the 1972 standard in place while requiring firms to include pro forma earnings 
statements reflecting “fair value” accounting for options in the footnotes to their 
financials.  See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 123 (Oct. 1995).  Fair value was and is defined as the value arrived at 
through use of the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing model or another appropriate 
model. 
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was not discontinuous.  The method undervalued all equity instruments 
except for restricted stock.  It incorrectly valued ATM options and out-
of-the-money options equally (at zero).   But along the continuum 
ranging from at-the-money options to restricted stock, the intrinsic value 
method resulted in a continuous, decreasing undervaluation of equity 
compensation expense.95  This accounting treatment discouraged firms 
from granting either discounted options or restricted stock and accounts, 
in part, for the boom in ATM options issued in the 1990s.96   
 In 2004, the FASB promulgated a standard requiring all firms to 
expense the grant date fair value of all equity compensation 
instruments.97   This standard eliminated the accounting bias in favor of 
non-discounted options.98   
 
B.  Stated Rationales for the Disparate Treatment of Discounted Options 
are Unpersuasive 
 
 What accounts for the disparate treatment of discounted options 
under the tax and accounting rules?  Although the legislative histories 
behind the tax provisions should certainly be taken with a grain of salt,99 
they seem a reasonable place to begin an exploration of the tax 
distinctions.  Unfortunately, we will see that the stated legislative 
rationales are unpersuasive, reflecting a false dichotomy between 
discounted and non-discounted options, rather than an economic 
continuum.  We will also observe, by taking the tax provisions 
chronologically, a general decline over time in the efforts taken to justify 
the disparate treatment, which might suggest path dependence, or more 
bluntly, that disparate treatment of discounted options has become an 
unthinking reaction in tax writing committees.    
 However, I will begin this section by reviewing the accounting story, 
which is somewhat clearer.  The disparate treatment of discounted 
options under GAAP prior to 2004 apparently reflected limitations of 
technology and politics.   
                                                 
95 The value of an option at any time is the sum of the option’s intrinsic value 
and the value of the option privilege.  The value of an ATM option is 100% option 
privilege.  The value of restricted stock is 100% intrinsic value.  The relationship of 
intrinsic value to option privilege between these poles is not linear, but it is continuous 
and monotonic.  See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 577-581 (8th ed. 2006).  
96 See David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927, 954-57 (discussing evidence). 
97 See FIN. ACCT. STD. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 123 (REVISED 2004).  
98 This is not to suggest that the new accounting standard is ideal.  See infra 
note 104. 
99 See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative 
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991) (noting that 
tax committee reports are produced by congressional staff and Treasury experts rather 
than congressmen, but arguing that the same is true in tax of statutory language).  
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1.  Corporate Financial Accounting 
 
 For many years, the majority view of the accounting profession has 
been that: 1) stock options are an element of compensation and should 
be recognized as an expense on the income statement, 2) ideally, the 
amount of the expense should be determined at grant when the options 
are transferred, and 3) conceptually, the amount of the expense that 
should be recognized is the fair market value of the option at grant.100  
Since 2004, GAAP has reflected these precepts, and as a result, the 
accounting rules are neutral with respect to the intrinsic value of options 
at grant.  But why wasn’t the playing field leveled earlier?   
 In part, the answer is technology.  The accounting profession began 
grappling with this issue well before Black, Scholes, and Merton figured 
out how to value stock options in the early 1970s.101  In establishing the 
intrinsic value method of accounting for options in 1953, the Committee 
on Accounting Procedure (the regulator that preceded the APB, which 
preceded FASB) stated that “[a]lthough there is, from the standpoint of 
the grantee, a value inherent in a restricted future right to purchase 
shares at a price at or even above the fair value of shares at the grant 
date, the committee believes it is impracticable to measure any such 
value.”102  In 1972, when the APB essentially reaffirmed the 1953 
standard, apparently a majority of the APB was of the same view.  Of 
the eighteen members of the APB, only two dissented from the opinion 
on the basis that techniques were adequate to value non-discounted 
options and that the full grant date value of all options, not just intrinsic 
values, should be expensed.103  
 It seems reasonably clear that the former accounting bias against 
discounted options was more technical than conceptual.  The intrinsic 
value method of accounting for options was simply the best that the 
accountants could do before option valuation techniques were 
developed.  Of course, there is a large gap in time between 1973, when 
the breakthrough papers on option valuation were published, and 2004, 
when FASB mandated model-based accounting for options.  Why did 30 
years pass before the fair value method of accounting for options 
supplanted the intrinsic method?  Again, technology may be a partial 
                                                 
100 See ACCT. PRINCIPLES BD., ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN NO. 43, Ch. 
13, Compensation, Section B- Compensation Involved in Stock Option and Stock 
Purchase Plans paras. 1, 10, and 11 (1953) (reprinted as App. B to APB 25) 
[hereinafter ARB 43] (expressing these views). 
101 The breakthrough articles were Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The 
Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) and Robert 
C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 141 
(1973).   
102 See ARB 43, supra note 100. 
103 See APB 25, supra note 4, at 479-480 (discussing dissenting views of 
board members Bows and Gellein). 
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answer.  As we will see in the next section, the Black-Scholes-Merton 
(BSM) model is not designed for employee stock options and its 
accuracy in that service is still debated.  The larger answer, however, is 
politics.  By the time the bulk of the accounting profession accepted the 
idea of using option valuation models to calculate compensation 
expense, option compensation had become so widespread and so 
intensive that publicly traded companies, particularly technology-related 
companies, feared the impact of the hit to earnings that would result 
from the change in methods and lobbied Congress and the FASB not to 
make the change.104  
 
2.  Statutory Stock Options 
 
 ISOs became a feature of the tax code in 1981, but the concept of a 
special tax regime applicable to certain options goes back to the 
restricted stock option rules of the 1950s.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the 
Code featured qualified stock options.  As we will see, however, each 
iteration has included restrictions on strike price discounts as a 
prerequisite for qualification for the special tax regime.  But the 
rationales offered for distinguishing between discounted and non-
discounted options in providing access to the special tax regime have 
been unpersuasive, perhaps reflecting an unsophisticated understanding 
of equity compensation arrangements. 
 In 1950, in proposing that ISO-like tax treatment be afforded to 
restricted stock options, the Senate Finance Committee argued that 
exercise date taxation of options impeded their use in creating 
incentives.105  The committee noted: 
 
Since the employee does not realize cash income at the time the 
option is exercised, the imposition of a tax at that time often 
works a real hardship.  An immediate sale of a portion of the 
stock acquired under the option may be necessary in order to 
finance the payment of the tax.  This, of course, reduces the 
effectiveness of the option as an incentive device.106 
 
                                                 
104 See Patricia M. Dechow et al, Economic Consequences of Accounting for 
Stock-Based Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 2-4 (1997) (describing the backlash 
created by the FASB’s proposal to require stock option expensing in the early 1990s).  
Note that interests opposing stock option expensing managed to delay implementation 
for over ten years after the FASB first officially proposed making the change. 
While I view the 2004 accounting standard as an improvement over the prior 
rule, I remain concerned about the manipulability of model-based option valuation, 
even for accounting purposes.  See David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax 
Conformity and Equity Compensation, ____ TAX L.REV. ____ (2009) (suggesting a 
mark-to-market approach to option expense recognition to reduce the potential for 
manipulation). 
105 S. REP. NO. 81-2375 (1950). 
106 Id. 
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 However, the Committee did not intend that taxation would be 
deferred for all employee stock options until the sale of the underlying 
shares.  It attempted to draw a line between options that were granted for 
incentive purposes (worthy of special treatment) and those that were 
merely compensatory (unworthy).  How could the two cases be 
distinguished?  “Ordinarily,” the Committee reported, “when an option 
is used as an incentive device, the option price approximates the fair 
market value of the stock at … grant[].”107  If an option was discounted, 
it was presumed to be compensatory, although, in order to allow for 
pricing uncertainty with respect to unlisted stocks, options with strike 
prices at least equal to 85% of the fair market value of the stock at grant 
were allowed to qualify.108  The tax treatment of the granting company 
further reinforced the division between incentive and compensation.  
Because grants of restricted stock options were “regarded as incentive 
devices rather than compensation, no deduction [was] allowed the 
corporation.”109  
 Of course, the distinction the Finance Committee attempted to draw 
between options granted to create incentives and those granted as 
compensation is spurious.  All forms of equity compensation – including 
options in, at, and out of the money; restricted stock; and performance 
shares – both create incentives and provide compensation.  To be sure, 
decreasing moneyness increases the sensitivity of the instrument to firm 
share price, but, as we have seen, optimal design is a function of many 
factors specific to a firm, its employees, and general market 
conditions.110  As a result, there is no a priori reason to think that a firm 
granting an option 50% in the money, or a combination of stock and 
non-discounted options, is any less interested in creating incentives than 
a firm granting only non-discounted options.111 
 The same discontinuous view of the world was reflected when 
restricted stock options were replaced by qualified stock options in the 
early 1960s.  The Kennedy administration advocated complete repeal of 
the restricted stock option regime, arguing that options were 
compensatory and should be taxed as consistently as possible with 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  Under the restricted stock option rules, each dollar of gain on options 
granted with a strike price equal to at least 95% of the underlying stock’s fair market 
value on the date of the grant was taxed at long-term capital gains rates.  If an option 
was granted with a strike price ranging from 85% to 95% of fair market value at grant, 
the difference between the strike price and 95% of fair market value was taxed as 
ordinary income on exercise and the rest of the gain taxed as long-term capital gain.  
See id. 
109 Id. 
110 See supra Part II.C. 
111 To be fair, I should emphasize that options were not well understood by 
economists, let alone politicians, in the 1950s.  The finance literature on employee 
stock options did not take off until after Black, Scholes, and Merton published their 
work on option valuation in 1973. 
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cash.112  The House Ways and Means Committee insisted, however, that 
the incentives provided by options benefited the economy as a whole, 
and therefore warranted special tax treatment.113  But the Committee 
recommended stricter pre-requisites.  By 1963, the Committee had 
concluded that the rule allowing firms to set strike prices as low as 85% 
of the fair market value of the stock at grant was being abused, and 
raised the minimum strike price qualifying for special tax treatment to 
100% of market in order to “decrease the compensatory nature of the 
existing stock option provision and to place greater emphasis on the 
employee’s efforts to improve his company’s business….”114   
 In 1981, when qualified stock options were resuscitated and renamed 
ISOs, no real attempt was made to justify the pre-requisite that 
qualifying options not be granted in the money.  There was initial 
disagreement between the chambers whether the 85% threshold of the 
restricted stock options regime or the 100%-of-market requirement of 
the qualified stock option regime should apply,115 but ultimately the 
latter was selected with no recorded discussion.  The Senate Finance 
Committee report, which was adopted on this point, simply echoed the 
JCT report, which noted that the rules were “designed to encourage the 
use of stock options for key employees without reinstituting the alleged 
abuses which arose with the restricted stock option provisions of prior 
law.”116 
 
3.  IRC § 162(m) 
 
 The § 162(m) safe harbor for non-discounted stock options is found 
in the regulations rather than the statute itself, but its contours and the 
                                                 
112 See President’s 1963 Tax Message, supra note 67, at 460-61 (testimony of 
Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury). 
113 H.R. REP. NO. 88-749 at 64 (1963). 
114 Id. at 65.  Even so, the qualified stock option rules provided that options 
that were unintentionally discounted would not be disqualified, but that a penalty 
would be imposed to discourage intentional undervaluation.  See id. 
The nature of the abuse resulting from qualifying discounted options is not 
perfectly clear.  In addition to the (misguided) idea that discounted options were 
uniquely compensatory, the Ways and Means Committee noted that under the 
restricted stock option regime discounted options were being used to raise capital 
rather than provide incentives.  See id. at 64.  But if equity pay was being used to raise 
capital (as opposed to providing compensation), capital gains tax treatment would 
seemingly be appropriate.     
115 See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., COMPARISON 
OF TAX PROVISIONS: H.R. 4242 (ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981) (Comm. 
Print 1981) (noting that the House Bill provided that ISO exercise prices must equal or 
exceed 85% of grant date fair market value while the Senate Bill required non-
discounted strike prices). 
116 STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., REPORT ON THE 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981 159 (Comm. Print 1981); see also S. REP. NO. 97-
144, at 98-99. 
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disparate treatment of discounted options were well fleshed out in the 
legislative history.  As described in the conference report: 
 
Stock options and other stock appreciation rights generally are 
treated as meeting the exception for performance-based 
compensation … because the amount of compensation 
attributable to the options or other rights received by the 
executives would be based solely on an increase in the 
corporation’s stock price….  Stock-based compensation is not 
treated as performance based if it is dependent on factors other 
than corporate performance.  For example, if a stock option is 
granted to an executive with an exercise price that is less than the 
current fair market value of the stock at the time of the grant, 
then the executive would have the right to receive compensation 
on the exercise of the option even if the stock price decreases or 
stays the same.  Thus, [such] options … do not meet the 
requirements for performance-based compensation.117 
 
 As in the case of the statutory stock option legislative history, this 
passage suggests a dichotomy in equity compensation that does not 
exist.  It is certainly true, as far as it goes, that an executive can profit 
from a discounted option if the stock price is flat, while profits on non-
discounted options require an increase in stock price.  However, the 
suggestion that gains on the former are “dependent on factors other than 
corporate performance,” while gains on the latter are not, is clearly 
overstated.  As is well understood, gains on traditional, non-discounted 
options are in large part due to market movements that are unrelated to 
specific corporate performance.118  It is for this reason that some 
commentators have suggested that the exercise prices of compensatory 
options be indexed to reduce the influence of market factors and focus 
option gains or losses on firm-specific performance.119 
 More generally, even if the lack of strike price indexing were not an 
issue, the passage reflects an artificial discontinuity at at-the-money 
options.  To be sure, the expected payoffs on restricted stock and deeply 
in-the-money options are less sensitive to share price movements than 
the payoffs for at-the-money options.  By the same token, however, at-
the-money options are less sensitive to stock price performance than out-
of-the-money options.  It is, after all, a continuum.  Thus, the claim that 
                                                 
117 H.R. REP. NO. 103-213, at 586-87 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). 
118 See David M. Schizer, Tax Constraints on Indexed Options, 149 U. PA. 
L.REV. 1941, 1942 n.8 (2001) (suggesting that a traditional, non-indexed option be 
thought of as “an indexed option paired with an option on the market”). 
119 See Rappaport, supra note 24, at 101; Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. 
Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate with 
Performance, 3 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 31 (1997). 
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non-discounted options are “inherently performance-based”120 while 
restricted stock and discounted options are not is unsupportable. 
 
4.  IRC § 409A 
 
 Neither the legislative history nor the preambles to the regulations 
attempt to justify the disparate treatment of discounted options under 
§ 409A.  The Treasury regulations faithfully follow the legislative 
history in distinguishing between non-discounted options, which 
generally are not subject to § 409A, and discounted options, which 
are.121  The conference report simply states without further explanation 
that  
 
it is not intended that the term “nonqualified deferred 
compensation plan” include an arrangement taxable under 
section 83 providing for the grant of an option on employer stock 
with an exercise price that is not less than the fair market value 
of the underlying stock on the date of grant if such arrangement 
does not include a deferral feature other than the feature that the 
option holder has the right to exercise the option in the future.122 
 
 The conference report does not mention restricted stock, but the 
Treasury regulations separately exclude restricted property from the 
reach of § 409A, stating that “there is no deferral of compensation 
merely because the value of the property [received] is not includible in 
income by reason of the property being substantially nonvested….”123 
 
C. Tax Policy Rationales for Discouraging Firms from Granting 
Discounted Options 
 
 If, as I have argued, the rationales for discriminating against 
discounted options found in the legislative histories are unpersuasive, is 
it time to eliminate disparities between in-, at-, and out-of-the-money 
options?  Well, not so fast.  This section elaborates the novel tax policy 
rationale for the disparate treatment of discounted options previewed 
above.  In brief, forcing firms to bifurcate equity pay into discrete 
bundles of stock and ATM options is desirable as a matter of tax policy 
in that it blocks unwarranted expansion of the preferential NQSO and 
                                                 
120 H.R. REP. NO. 103-213 (1993) (Conf. Rep.). 
121 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 409A (Reg-158080-04) (Oct. 4, 
2005) (citing legislative history); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(5)(i)(A). 
122 H.R. REP. NO. 108-755 at 735 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).  The reference to a 
secondary deferral feature responds to attempts by optionees to defer option taxation 
beyond exercise, e.g., by converting the intrinsic value of an option into an unfunded, 
unsecured promise to pay further in the future. 
123 Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(b)(6)(i). 
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ISO regimes to include deeply discounted options and, effectively, 
restricted stock.  
 On the other hand, this section also suggests that expansion of the 
NQSO and ISO regimes to include stock-like instruments would not 
likely be catastrophic for the public fisc.  Directionally, limiting these 
regimes is good tax policy, but the magnitude of the benefit is debatable 
and it certainly would be difficult to quantify.   
 
1.  Equity Compensation Can Be Tax Advantaged  
 
a.  Restricted Stock and NQSOs 
 
 Most analysts have concluded that taxation under § 83 and § 1.83-7 
provides a tax advantage for firms that compensate their employees with 
equity.124   The reason, in a nutshell, is that investment returns are or can 
be exempted from tax.  There are several ways of portraying this effect.  
This is one. 
 I will assume, as is conventional, that an employee invests in the 
stock of her employer, either directly with after-tax cash compensation, 
or indirectly, through receipt of equity-based pay.  First, consider a firm 
that is effectively tax exempt due to a large net operating loss (NOL) 
position.125  Suppose that instead of paying an employee in cash, it 
grants the employee restricted stock.  Absent a § 83(b) election, the 
employee will not be taxed until the stock vests.  Had the employee 
received cash, she would have been taxed immediately.  As is widely 
recognized in the academic literature, under certain conditions the 
deferral of taxation is equivalent to imposing the tax initially, but 
exempting investment returns on the after-tax amount.126  What about 
                                                 
124 See Walker, supra note 15, at 755-57 (synthesizing the employee and 
employer taxation of equity compensation); Knoll, supra note 15, at 214 (finding that 
“over a range of circumstances” equity compensation is tax advantaged); see also 
Halperin, supra note 15 (seminal article on time value issues and taxation, including 
consideration of the tax efficiency of deferred compensation); but see Yale, supra note 
15 (arguing that the tax benefit of deferred compensation should be viewed as only the 
avoided after-tax cost of financing the incremental investment made possible by 
deferral of the tax). 
125 To the extent that a corporation’s tax deductions exceed its gross income in 
any given year, the net loss may be carried back two tax years and carried forward 20 
years.  IRC § 172(b). 
126 See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, 
in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 300-316 (1948); Halperin, supra note 
15.  Equivalence depends on the assumption that tax rates remain constant.  A familiar 
example of the Brown theorem is the economic equivalence between conventional 
IRAs and 401(k) plans that defer tax on investment income until retirement and Roth 
IRAs and 401(k)s that provide for tax-exempt earnings on after-tax contributions.  
However, equivalence in this case is undermined by the fact that the caps on 
contributions, while nominally the same, are effectively different.  See MICHAEL J. 
GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 746 (5th ed. 2005). 
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the employer?  It has extra cash on hand as a result of compensating the 
employee with stock, but any investment returns go untaxed because this 
employer is hypothesized to be effectively tax exempt.127 
 Second, consider the other extreme, an employer paying tax at the 
maximum marginal rate.  Now we have to consider the possibility that 
the taxation of investment returns is simply shifted from the employee to 
the employer who has cash freed up as a result of the decision to 
compensate the employee with equity.  The analysis is quite complex, 
but we can be sure of exemption of investment returns at the employer 
level if the firm uses the freed-up cash to repurchase its own shares on 
the market at the time it grants stock to its employee, because, under 
IRC § 1032, firms are not taxed on gains or losses from trades in their 
own equity.128  Many firms manage the dilution resulting from equity 
compensation programs by repurchasing shares in this manner, and in 
this scenario, again, neither the employer nor the employee bears any tax 
on the investment return on the stock grant.129   
 The analysis is analogous, but still more complicated, for NQSO 
compensation.  Again, option compensation definitely results in 
exemption of investment returns in the case of loss firms and firms that 
perfectly hedge compensatory options.130  However, there is a key 
difference between stock and options.  For stock grants, the deferral of 
income inclusion and potential exemption of investment returns lasts 
                                                                                                                            
As an example of the deferral/exemption equivalence in the present context 
consider the following:  Employee A receives $100 cash compensation, pays tax of 
$40, and purchases company shares with the remaining $60.  At time 2, the stock has 
doubled in value and A sells it for $120.  A’s after tax cash is $120 less whatever tax is 
imposed on the $60 investment gain.   
Employee B receives $100 worth of restricted stock at time 1.  There is no tax 
at that point.  At time 2 the stock has doubled in value to $200 and vests.  B pays tax of 
$80 ($200 x 40%), and is left with $120 after tax, which is the same position that A 
would be in if we exempted from further taxation her investment return on her after-tax 
cash compensation. 
127 It is important in any analysis of compensation taxation to consider the 
taxation of both the employee and employer.  See SCHOLES ET AL, supra note 2, at 3. 
128 If one assumes that corporate financing decisions and compensation 
decisions are independent such that firms ultimately repurchase from the market the 
same number of shares that are issued to employees via stock or option grants (or 
reduce planned issuances), the investment exemption analysis turns on repurchase  (or 
forgone issuance) timing.  If repurchases are made when shares vest or options are 
exercised and the freed up cash from equity grants generates a taxable return in the 
interim, substitute taxation would result.  If equity grants are perfectly hedged by firms 
repurchasing shares at the time of the grants, there is no substitute taxation.  See 
Walker, supra note 15, at 729-40.  If, on the other hand, equity compensation increases 
equity capitalization because a firm is unwilling or unable to issue additional equity 
directly, it is very difficult to assess whether substitute taxation arises.  Empirical 
evidence indicates that stock buybacks conducted in conjunction with equity 
compensation programs are common, although the timing of these buybacks varies.  
See id. at 743-48. 
129 See id.   
130 See id. 
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only until the shares vest.  For options, the deferral/exemption extends 
until exercise, which could be several years later. 
 But this is not the end of the story.  Exemption of investment returns 
is only advantageous if investment returns are positive.  If returns are 
negative, exemption means the loss of a capital loss.131  As a result, in a 
tax system permitting full deductibility of losses and assuming no 
trading on inside information, the tax advantage of equity compensation 
would be quite limited on an ex ante basis.132  However, if one assumes 
that capital loss limitations on outside investments would have real bite 
and if one considers the fact that insiders generally outperform the 
market, so that the prospect of gain and risk of loss are not symmetric, 
equity compensation begins to appear significantly tax advantaged even 
on an ex ante basis.133  Moreover, on the reasonable assumption that 
investment returns are a function of the investment period, the additional 
deferral achievable with NQSOs heightens their tax advantage over 
restricted stock. 
 
b.  ISOs 
 
 I have already noted that ISO taxation is not advantageous relative to 
NQSO taxation from a global tax perspective if the employer’s marginal 
tax rate is equal to the statutory rate.  Relative to NQSO taxation, the 
ISO regime converts ordinary compensation income for the employee 
into capital gain,134 but the cost is the complete loss of the employer’s 
tax deduction for compensation conferred.135  As Myron Scholes and his 
colleagues demonstrate, under current law and assuming that the 
optionee sells the stock received on exercise one year later, the 
breakeven corporate marginal tax rate is about 24%.136  If the effective 
marginal tax rate is greater than 24%, NQSOs are jointly tax 
advantaged; if less than 24%, ISOs are better.  The key to the tax 
advantage of ISOs, however, is that use of the regime is elective.  
Presumably most employers issuing ISOs face a low or zero effective 
tax rate.137  In these cases, there is little or no offset against the 
                                                 
131 One can think of capital income taxation as a partnership between the 
taxpayer and the government in which the two share in gains and losses.  However, as 
in the case of some partnerships between natural persons, the government does not 
share equally in gains and losses on capital investments.  See IRC § 1211 (limiting 
deductibility of capital losses); see also Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship 
Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO STATE L. J. 1401 
(2004) (discussing asymmetry of capital gain and loss taxation). 
132 See Yale, supra note 15. 
133 See Walker, supra note 15, at 715-720. 
134 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.      
135 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
136 See SCHOLES ET AL, supra note 2, at 230, tbl 8.4. 
137 Corporate effective marginal tax rates exhibit significant variation.  See, 
e.g., John R. Graham, Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 49 (1996) 
(simulating effective marginal tax rates for 11,000 Compustat firms in the years 1980 
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employee’s conversion of ordinary compensation income into capital 
gain, and the ISO regime is even further tax advantaged than the NQSO 
regime.   
 
2.  Pre-Exercise Taxation of Options is Problematic 
 
 Generally, compensation arising from restricted stock is taxed at 
vesting.138  Vesting date taxation would reduce the tax advantage of 
options, but, of course, neither the NQSO or ISO regime follows that 
approach.  Rather, both systems adopt a “wait and see” attitude.  Under 
the NQSO regime, we wait until exercise to tax gains; under the ISO 
regime, we wait until sale of the underlying shares.  Arguably, 
difficulties of pre-exercise valuation contribute to the difference in the 
taxation of stock and non-discounted options. 
 This section describes why taxation of option compensation based 
on fair value prior to exercise is problematic.  It also discusses the 
alternative of taxing options based on their intrinsic value at vesting.  
While this alternative is not perfectly consistent with the taxation of 
restricted stock, it has administrative advantages.  Nonetheless, I argue 
that this approach is also problematic.  Finally, this section notes that 
while pre-exercise valuation concerns might justify NQSO taxation, 
these concerns do not justify the ISO tax regime.139   
 Throughout this section, “options” should be read as options at or 
near the money at grant.  As I note in several places, valuation 
difficulties associated with deeply discounted options would be much 
less severe.140 
 
a.  Pre-Exercise Taxation Based on the Fair Value of Options is 
Problematic 
 
 Theoretically, grant date taxation of the fair value of stock and 
options would eliminate any tax advantage of equity compensation 
relative to the accrual tax ideal.  Less ambitiously, vesting date valuation 
                                                                                                                            
to 1992 and finding that in any year about 1/3 of firms had effective marginal tax rates 
equal to the top statutory rate, about 1/5 had effective marginal tax rates of zero, and 
the remainder had rates in between). 
138 Of course, formerly restricted stock held beyond vesting will have tax 
consequences, but the compensatory aspect of the transaction is complete and is taxed 
at vesting. 
139 This section focuses on schemes in which option compensation would be 
fully taxed at vesting.  Another possibility would be to tax option compensation partly 
at vesting and partly at exercise as a compromise between accuracy and 
administrability.  However, such an approach would at best mitigate the considerable 
difficulties involved with taxing option compensation prior to exercise.   
140 Just as the incentive properties of instruments ranging from restricted stock 
to non-discounted options are continuous and monotonic, the valuation difficulty of the 
range of instruments is continuous and monotonic.  See infra note 155 and 
accompanying text.  
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and taxation of compensation arising from options would eliminate the 
tax advantage of options over stock.  However, as Victor Fleischer and I 
have argued, pre-exercise taxation of options utilizing current 
technology raises numerous concerns.141  Here I will focus on just two – 
valuation and manipulation.   
 Except for the case of a deeply in-the-money option, the intrinsic 
value of an option at any time represents only a fraction of the option’s 
total value.142  As a result, accurate determination of the fair value of 
non-deeply discounted options prior to exercise generally would require 
the use of an option pricing model, such as the BSM or binomial models 
that are used to value compensatory options under current GAAP.  
These models were designed for relatively short-term traded options.  
The models are not perfect in that service, but their imperfections are 
magnified when applied to long-dated employee options.143  In addition, 
the models must be adjusted to account for the non-transferability of 
employee options, and these adjustments can lead to overvaluation.144  
In short, while these models may be sufficiently reliable to determine 
aggregate option cost and earnings adjustments firm by firm, they may 
not be sufficiently reliable to form the basis for taxing individual 
optionees.   
 Second, and perhaps more important, the results of these models are 
highly sensitive to firm-specific projections of stock price volatility, 
expected time to option exercise, and dividend yields.  As a result, the 
valuations are highly manipulable.145  One analyst has determined that a 
firm seeking to maximize the grant date option value of an ATM option 
could reasonably select inputs and “report values almost double those 
reported by an otherwise similar firm seeking to undervalue its 
options.”146   
                                                 
141 See Walker & Fleischer, supra note 104 (describing valuation and 
manipulation problems inherent in pre-exercise taxation of options); see also David M. 
Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive 
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 473 (2000) (noting that pre-exercise taxation 
“would invite self-serving taxpayer valuations”). 
142 See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 95, at 577. 
143 See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Expensing Employee Stock Options 38 
(AEI Working Paper, Aug. 5, 2005), (suggesting that valuation errors may exceed 20% 
in 10% of the cases); Carol A. Marquardt, The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: 
An Empirical Assessment, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1191, 1214 (2002) (finding that while an 
adjusted Black-Scholes model provided reasonable estimates of ex post option cost, on 
average, there was “significant variability in the amount of model error on an option-
by-option basis”). 
144 See Thomas Hemmer et al., Estimating the “Fair Value” of Employee 
Stock Options with Expected Early Exercise, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 23, 27-38 (1994); 
Phelim Boyle & William R. Scott, Executive Stock Options and Concavity of the 
Option Price, 13 J. DERIVATIVES 72, 72-77 (2006). 
145 See Walker & Fleischer, supra note 104, at 35-37. 
146 Mark Rubinstein, On the Accounting Valuation of Employee Stock Options, 
2 J. DERIVATIVES 8, 17 (Fall 1995).  
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 Suppose that employee inclusion and employer deductions for 
options were based on the fair value of the options at vesting as 
determined by a pricing model.  Subsequent gain or loss would be 
capital gain or loss for the employee and would have no tax consequence 
for the employer.  A firm in a large NOL position would be able to 
select model inputs that undervalue options, thus converting employee 
ordinary income into capital gain.  The firm would suffer a reduction in 
its tax deduction for the options, but given the large NOL, the expected 
present value of that sacrifice might be small.147  On the other hand, if an 
employee faced a relatively low marginal tax rate on ordinary income, 
model-based taxation would allow a high marginal tax rate firm to 
overvalue options and maximize its deduction.  The problem, of course, 
is that the opportunity to manipulate option valuation and the allocation 
of tax burdens would be essentially elective. 
 Accuracy and manipulation problems may explain why we do not 
attempt to tax the fair value of options at vesting consistent with the 
taxation of restricted stock.148  However, there are other alternatives to 
option taxation, such as intrinsic value taxation at vesting.  
 
b.  Pre-Exercise Taxation of Options Based on Intrinsic Value is 
Also Problematic 
 
 To some extent, the problems discussed above could be avoided by 
treating the intrinsic value at vesting as the measure of compensation 
arising from an option.  The difference between the fair market value of 
the underlying stock and exercise price of the option at vesting is readily 
observable and is not manipulable, at least in the case of public 
companies.  To be sure, the intrinsic value will always be less than the 
fair value of the option.149  Thus, compared with fair value taxation at 
                                                 
147 For example, assume that the fair value of an option at vesting is $300, that 
the exercise price is $100, and that the shares ultimately are sold at $600.  Fair value 
taxation at vesting would result in the employee recognizing $200 of compensation 
income at vesting and $300 of capital gain when the shares are sold.  The employer 
would have a $200 deduction at vesting.  However, if model inputs are manipulated to 
generate a $250 value at vesting, the employee would report $150 ordinary income and 
$350 capital gain.  The employer would deduct $150. 
148 Professor Halperin has proposed that a special tax be applied to the 
investment returns on non-qualified deferred compensation in order to achieve the 
same overall result as accrual taxation.  See Halperin, supra note 15, at 539-550.  If 
such a scheme could be effectively applied to equity compensation, the tax advantage 
of stock and option pay would be eliminated, and the tax policy argument I am making 
for forcing firms to bifurcate ITM pay packages into non-discounted options and stock 
would fall away.  Unfortunately, however, as Halperin notes, one must calculate the 
value of compensation at grant in order to determine how much investment income 
should be subject to the special tax.  See id. at 544-49.  For options, this brings us back 
to the accuracy and manipulation issues inherent in model-based valuation. 
149 As discussed supra note 95, the fair value of an option at any time is 
comprised of the option’s intrinsic value and the value of the remaining option 
privilege.  For an option that is at or out of the money, option privilege constitutes 
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vesting, this intrinsic value method would convert employee ordinary 
income into capital gain.  However, there would be an offset in that 
employer tax deductions would be reduced by the difference between 
the fair value and the intrinsic value at vesting.   
 If this method sounds quite like the current ISO rules, it should.  It is 
also the method favored by Justice Harlan in LoBue.150  Under this 
system, if an option had zero intrinsic value at vesting, the employer 
would receive no deduction, the employee would have no ordinary 
income, and all gains would be capital.  Firms presumably would react 
to such a system much as they do to the current ISO regime.  Those with 
low effective marginal tax rates would likely embrace it.  At these 
companies, the conversion of employee ordinary income into capital 
gain would benefit recipients and come at little or no cost to the firm.  
Firms with high marginal tax rates would be unenthusiastic and would 
likely replace options with another form of compensation.  As with 
today’s ISOs, for these firms the reduction in the corporate tax deduction 
would outweigh the benefit of converting a like amount of employee 
ordinary income into capital gain.  Corporate effective marginal tax rates 
appear to exhibit significant variation.151  As a result, an intrinsic value 
method of option taxation would still create a “heads you win, tails I 
lose” whipsaw for the government.152   
 
c.  Difficulty of Pre-Exercise Taxation Does Not Justify the ISO 
Regime 
 
 While pre-exercise valuation and manipulation concerns might 
justify the tax treatment of NQSOs relative to restricted stock, these 
concerns do not justify the additional tax advantage of the ISO regime.  
Considered solely as a question of tax policy, the ISO regime seems 
regrettable and any potential expansion undesirable.153  As we have 
                                                                                                                            
100% of the fair value of the option.  For a deeply in-the-money option or a modestly 
in-the-money option nearing expiration, the value of the option privilege becomes 
small relative to intrinsic value.  See BREALEY ET AL, supra note 95, at 577-581.   
150 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
151 See Graham, supra note 137, at 48-49. 
152 It is hard to know how much of this was recognized by the majority in 
LoBue which rejected Justice Harlan’s approach.  It seems more likely that the Court 
simply resisted the idea of levying a tax before the fair value of the compensation could 
be reasonably measured.  There is no discussion of the possibility of firms and 
employees engaging in tax planning with respect to compensation design in LoBue. 
153 Alternatively, one could view the ISO regime as a tax preference or tax 
expenditure program – similar to preferences aimed at encouraging employer-provided 
health insurance or owner-occupied housing.  See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, 
PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).  In this 
case, the tax preference would be aimed at encouraging firms and employees to qualify 
options as ISOs, e.g., holding shares underlying ISOs for at least a year following 
exercise.  IRC § 422(a).  Viewing the ISO rules as a tax preference muddies the 
normative analysis, but in my view fails to justify the additional ISO tax advantage. 
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seen, as an elective regime, the ISO rules allow NOL firms to confer 
tax-advantaged compensation on their employees with no offsetting tax 
burden at the firm level.  In addition, the ISO rules add complexity and 
the opportunity for firms that are poorly advised or that cater to their 
employees rather than their shareholders to get the ISO/NQSO 
calculation wrong.154 
 
3. Absent Special Tax/Accounting Rules, Firms Could Achieve 
NQSO/ISO Taxation on Instruments Resembling Restricted 
Stock 
 
 The heavy lifting in constructing the tax policy argument justifying 
rules discriminating against discounted options is complete.  It remains 
to be shown only that, absent § 409A and the ISO rules, firms could 
easily achieve NQSO or ISO tax treatment on instruments resembling 
restricted stock by issuing deeply discounted stock options instead. 
 Suppose a firm planned to make an outright grant to an employee of 
1000 shares of restricted stock at a time when the shares were trading at 
$100.  Suppose the grant was to vest in full in three years.  Absent a 
§ 83(b) election, the shares would be taxed at vesting based on the fair 
market value at that point.  Absent § 409A and the ISO rules, the firm 
apparently could substitute a deeply discounted option and defer 
taxation until exercise or sale of the underlying shares.  For example, an 
option on 1333 shares with a strike price of $25/share would have the 
same grant date aggregate intrinsic value as the restricted stock.  To be 
sure, the fair value of the option would be slightly greater than that of 
the stock, reflecting the fact that even deeply discounted options are 
worth more than their intrinsic value.  The incremental option value, 
which is not transparent, might drive a wedge between subjective 
employee valuation and employer cost.  But at least some financially 
sophisticated employees and employers would take advantage of the 
opportunity to defer tax beyond vesting on deeply discounted options.   
 Again, this substitution offends tax policy because the pragmatic 
reasons for allowing deferral of tax on non-discounted options beyond 
vesting do not apply to stock.  The restricted stock alternative in this 
case is easily valued at vesting.155 
                                                 
154 Firms that grant ISOs have a subsequent opportunity to disqualify the 
options and achieve NQSO taxation.  Studies show that many firms that could reduce 
combined employer/employee taxes by disqualifying ISOs fail to do so because of 
complexity and/or earnings considerations.  See SCHOLES ET AL, supra note 2, at 232.  
On the other hand, some firms apparently utilize ISOs despite a global tax 
disadvantage.  Doing so may reduce employee-level taxes, but it is difficult to see how 
this choice benefits shareholders.  See id. at 231 & n. 19. 
155 In fact, in the case of deeply discounted options, we could apply option 
pricing models with much less concern about accuracy or potential manipulation, 
because the value of the option privilege, which is what is really being modeled, 
represents a relatively small portion of the total option value.  In the case of a 75% 
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4.  Expansion of NQSO/ISO Regimes to Include Stock Would Not 
Likely Be Catastrophic for the Public Fisc 
 
 Directionally, it seems to me that allowing the NQSO and ISO 
regimes to expand in the direction of restricted stock would be bad tax 
policy, and thus the effects of § 409A and the ISO prohibition on 
discounting are serendipitously positive.  However, the extent to which 
elimination of these rules would burden the public fisc is debatable. 
 
a.  Restricted Stock Conversion into NQSOs 
 
 The incremental tax advantage of NQSOs over restricted stock that I 
have described holds only if recipients retain their options unexercised 
post-vesting and accept the risk of a stock price decline.  As a practical 
matter, achieving additional deferral of tax through conversion of stock 
awards into discounted options and holding these options beyond 
vesting comes at a heavy cost of postponed diversification.  Employees, 
who face a great deal of firm-specific risk, routinely sacrifice potential 
deferral benefits and option value by exercising options well before 
expiration, often only shortly after vesting.156  Thus, it is an empirical 
question, but it is not clear that the additional income deferral that would 
                                                                                                                            
strike price discount, an option’s intrinsic value would likely account for more than 
90% of the total option value at grant.  For example, using the option pricing 
assumptions of note 161, infra, the BSM value of an option with a $25/share strike 
price on stock trading at $100/share at grant would be $79.60/option share, consisting 
of $75 intrinsic value and $4.60 value of option privilege. 
156 See J. Carr Bettis et al., Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive 
Effects of Employee Stock Options, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 445, 446 (2005) (finding for a 
sample of 140,000 option exercises by executives at almost 4000 firms between 1996 
and 2002 that, on average, options were exercised a little over two years following 
vesting and more than four years prior to expiration); Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, 
Employee Stock Option Exercises: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 5 
(1996) (finding that the median fraction of option life elapsed at the time of exercise 
ranged from 0.21 to 0.38 for options granted by seven public companies to a wide 
range of employees); Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive 
Stock Options, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1998) (finding for a sample of forty firms (mainly 
large manufacturers) that executive stock options granted between 1983 and 1984 
were, on average, exercised after 5.8 years). 
As an alternative to early exercise, some executives enter into hedging 
transactions that lessen the risk of continuing to hold compensatory stock options.  See 
J. Carr Bettis et al., Managerial Ownership, Incentive Contracting, and the Use of 
Zero-Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders, 36 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 345, 352 (2001) (identifying 87 zero-cost collar and 2 equity 
swap transactions entered into by corporate executives between 1996 and 1998 and 
speculating that their sample represented only a fraction of actual hedging 
transactions).  As David Schizer has demonstrated, a combination of tax rules penalizes 
executives who hedge options, see Schizer, supra note 141, thus, many of these 
hedging transactions are likely driven by disclosure concerns and can be analogized for 
our purposes to early exercise. 
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actually occur as a result of conversion of stock into discounted options 
would be terribly significant.  We can be sure that the additional periods 
of deferral generally would be far less than the difference between the 
average vesting period for the typical grant of restricted stock (about 
three years)157 and the ten year contractual life of most options.158 
 Deferral through conversion of stock awards into discounted options 
also carries some risk of the firm failing to perform on the option 
contract during the period between vesting and exercise.  This risk also 
tends to limit deferral of option exercise and the tax advantage of 
options in the real world.  Of course, the performance risk associated 
with holding employee stock options will vary firm by firm.  (Not every 
firm is an Enron or Lehman waiting to implode.)  Moreover, employees 
may be able to limit performance risk by exercising options and selling 
shares before disaster strikes.    
 
b.  Restricted Stock Conversion into ISOs   
 
 Eliminating the prohibition on ISO discounting would roughly 
double the maximum size of ISO grants, assuming no other change in 
the ISO rules.  While doubling sounds significant, it is worth noting that 
the maximum value of grants has fallen in real terms by more than half 
since the regime was put in place in 1981.  Given the limit on ISO grants 
combined with the fact that ISOs are uneconomic for many firms, 
expanding the regime to include deeply discounted options might have 
less impact on the public fisc than opening up the NQSO regime.159  But 
to explore these points, we will have to delve into the limitation on ISO 
grants. 
 Under IRC § 422(d), there is a non-inflation adjusted annual limit on 
ISO grants of $100,000 per recipient.  The $100,000 limit applies to the 
aggregate fair market value of stock subject to ISOs that first becomes 
exercisable in a given year, and the dollar limit is based on the market 
                                                 
157 See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., supra note 21, at 14. 
158 In all likelihood, employees would exercise deeply in-the-money options 
resembling restricted stock at least as early as traditional ATM options.  The value of 
the option privilege relative to intrinsic value is likely to be less for an option granted 
deeply in the money than one granted at the money.  This suggests that, on average, the 
holder of an ITM option would have more to gain by early exercise in terms of 
achieving diversification and less to lose in giving up option privilege than the holder 
of an ATM option.  See Huddart & Lang, supra note 156, at 34 (finding that the 
probability of early exercise was strongly correlated with the ratio of the market price 
of the stock at exercise to the strike price); but see Bettis et al. (2005), supra note 156, 
at 457 (finding a negative, but statistically insignificant, relationship between early 
exercise and the ratio of market price at exercise to strike price). 
159 Although elimination of the prohibition on discounting could have some 
effect on the mix, ISOs currently account for a relatively small fraction of 
compensatory options.  See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of 
Executive Compensation, 14 NBER/TAX POL’Y & ECON. 7 (2000) (estimating that 
ISOs account for about 5% of options granted). 
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value of the stock subject to the option on the date of the grant.  
Purported ISO shares in excess of this amount are treated as NQSO 
shares. 
 Inflated by the CPI, a 1981 dollar is worth $2.42 today.160  Thus, in 
real terms, maximum ISO grants have fallen in value by more than half 
since the enactment of the ISO regime.  Because the cap is based on the 
value of the shares underlying options rather than the value of the 
options themselves, much of this decline would be reversed by 
expanding the ISO regime to include deeply discounted options, if we 
assume that the form of the limitation was not revised.   
 To see this, suppose first that a firm issues ATM options as ISOs.  
For illustration, we will assume that the fair market value of the 
underlying stock on the date of the grant is $100/share, and I will adopt 
a set of assumptions (detailed in the margin) regarding stock price 
volatility, time to exercise, etc., that would be reasonable for a large 
manufacturing firm and that will allow us to calculate BSM values.161  
Under these assumptions, the ATM options are worth about $39/share.  
Per § 422(d), 1000 shares can vest as ISOs in any given year, for total 
ISO grant value of $39,000.  Now suppose that the firm issues deeply 
discounted options as ISOs.  If the strike price is reduced to $25/share, 
for example, the value rises to just under $80/option share, and the firm 
can issue to an employee an ISO worth $80,000.162   
 Since the ISO regime is elective, presumably most firms that see 
value in issuing ISOs would want to take full advantage of the 
opportunity, and issuing deeply discounted options as ISOs would be 
tempting.  Of course, for a senior corporate executive, an increase in the 
value of an ISO grant from $39,000 to $80,000 would be a drop in the 
bucket.  For a rank and file employee of a technology company, 
however, the difference could be significant.   
 However, before we conclude that expanding the ISO regime to 
include deeply discounted options would pose a great threat to the public 
fisc, two points are worth emphasizing.  First, Congress could obviously 
change the basis of the ISO cap from the value of the underlying shares 
to the value of the grant.  Even if BSM is not an adequate basis for 
ultimate taxation, it may be adequate for determining the number of 
                                                 
160 Inflated by the rate of growth of executive compensation, 1981 dollars 
would be worth far more than $2.42 today. 
161 The assumptions made for illustration are as follows: $100/share grant date 
stock value, 35% stock price volatility, 6 years to option exercise, a risk free interest 
rate of 3%, and no dividends.  All option values in this article were determined using 
the calculator found at http://www.option-price.com/.   
162 The ISO opportunity could be stretched even further by pushing the strike 
price down near zero, but if Congress simply repealed § 422(d) without specifically 
embracing deeply discounted options as ISOs, a firm might choose to be conservative 
to minimize the possibility that a court might determine that the instrument was not an 
option and could not be an ISO. 
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option shares to be treated as an ISO or an NQSO.163  Second, bear in 
mind that ISOs are only attractive, relative to NQSOs, for firms with low 
effective marginal tax rates.   
 
 
IV.  OTHER EXPLANATIONS FOR TAX RULES DISCRIMINATING AGAINST 
DISCOUNTED OPTIONS 
 
  
 Part III documented the disparate treatment of discounted options, 
criticized the rationales for the disparity found in the regulatory 
histories, and put forward a tax policy rationale that might justify the 
efficiency loss associated with distorting corporate compensation 
arrangements.  This part briefly suggests three rationales apart from tax 
that might explain, if not justify, the disparate treatment of discounted 
options.  First, discounted options may appear to be a giveaway to 
executives.  Congress may have wanted to avoid appearing to endorse or 
encourage the use of such options.  Second, Congress may have felt that 
discounted options would lead to an actual giveaway – that executives 
would not fully pay for the moneyness of discounted options through 
reductions in the size of grants or other pay.  Third, Congress might 
have been trying to protect potential recipients from irrational 
exuberance in favor of discounted options. 
 
A.  Symbolic Legislation 
 
 Even if compensation packages were optimally designed, it is likely 
that some observers would consider the issuance of discounted options 
to be a giveaway to recipients.  These observers would view positive 
intrinsic value at grant as “money in the pocket” and raise the intuitively 
appealing argument that recipients can profit from discounted options 
even if share prices fail to rise.   
 Congress might wish to avoid the appearance of endorsing specific 
pay practices that would generate investor outrage.  IRC § 162(m) may 
be viewed in this light generally.  It can be seen as symbolic legislation 
that seeks less to solve a social problem than to demonstrate to voters 
that Congress shares their concerns and is taking action to deal with the 
problem, in the case of § 162(m) generally, excessive pay and the 
perception that pay was not linked to performance.164   
                                                 
163 The current limitation on the size of ISO grants is based on the value of the 
underlying shares, rather than the value of the options, and thus is quite inconsistent 
firm to firm.  Switching to a value limit utilizing BSM would almost surely improve 
consistency.    
164 For more on symbolic legislation, see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public 
Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax 
Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L.REV. 1, 8 (1990); Mark Tushnet & Larry 
Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and 
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 Similarly, the distinction between discounted and non-discounted 
options in the ISO rules, § 162(m), and § 409A might reflect, in part, 
congressional concern about the possibility of appearing to endorse or 
simply countenance explicitly discounted (read giveaway) options. 
 
B.  Avoiding an Actual Giveaway 
 
 It is possible that, prior to widespread use of the BSM option pricing 
model, pay packages that included discounted options could have 
resulted in greater overall executive pay than packages lacking 
discounted options, at least under a compensation setting process 
reflecting the managerial power view.  Rules discouraging in-the-money 
options might have responded to this concern. 
 The upshot of rules discriminating against discounted options is that 
equity compensation is funneled into two discrete pools – stock awards 
and ATM options.  We see this empirically, and it is not surprising given 
the tax and accounting rules.  Channeling equity into these discrete pools 
may have facilitated comparison of executive pay packages, particularly 
prior to the widespread application of the BSM pricing model to 
compensatory options.  Under the managerial power view, greater 
transparency and comparability inhibits excess compensation because 
deviations from the pack are easier to spot and attack.165  If instead of 
granting just ATM options or combinations of ATM options and 
restricted stock, firms had issued a diverse range of option instruments 
of varied moneyness, comparing option grants might have been more 
difficult and total pay somewhat higher.166 
 Today, now that use of the BSM model is more widespread, it would 
be much easier to compare the value of options issued with varying 
degrees of grant date moneyness, and it is less likely that executives 
could extract greater compensation through particular option design, 
even if the managerial power view holds.  Nonetheless, it is possible that 
this concern helped motivate discrimination against discounted options.   
 
C.  Protecting Employees against Irrational Exuberance 
  
 During the recent stock option backdating scandal, some observers 
suggested that one motivation for backdating might have been that 
                                                                                                                            
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-
76 (1997). 
165 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 41; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 41. 
166 Even under the managerial power view, greater pay does not necessarily 
follow from discounting strike prices.  The reverse effect is also possible.  Because 
intrinsic value is more salient than the value of the option privilege, the ratio of 
executive pay to investor outrage may be maximized by granting options right at the 
money, despite the greater comparability of all options being granted at the money. See 
infra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 41; 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 41. 
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option recipients would value the discount on an option beyond the 
economic value (and shareholder cost) of that discount.167  Since the 
accounting rules effectively barred firms from discounting options 
openly, so this story runs, firms backdated in order to discount options 
surreptitiously and cash in on this irrational employee exuberance.168  
Rules discouraging the grant of openly discounted options might have 
the effect, and possibly the intent, of protecting employees against being 
taken advantage of in this fashion. 
 There is some evidence that option recipients focus excessively on 
moneyness in subjectively valuing options,169 and this is not 
counterintuitive.  Despite easy access to on-line BSM calculators, the 
intrinsic value of an option at grant is likely to be much more salient 
than the value of the option privilege – the opportunity to benefit from 
further increases in stock price without risking capital.170  For example, 
an employee comparing an ATM option on stock trading at $100/share 
and an ITM option, on the same stock, with a $90 strike price might 
think that the latter option is worth $10/option share more than the 
former, or something close to that, when in reality the difference in BSM 
value would more likely be in the $3 to $4/option share range.171  If so, 
an explicitly discounted option would be more highly valued by the 
recipient than a package of stock and a non-discounted option, even if 
that package could be designed to provide identical payoffs.   
 Of course, the tax rules have not discouraged firms from granting 
restricted stock, which is a zero strike price option, but it is unlikely that 
irrational exuberance in favor of discounted options would extend all the 
way to restricted stock.  Unless an employee viewed an ATM option as 
being worthless, she could not conceivably view the difference in value 
between an ATM option and restricted stock as being equal to the 
difference between their strike prices, since the restricted stock is worth 
                                                 
167 Option backdating refers to the practice of picking an option grant date 
with hindsight.  For an option purportedly issued at the money, picking a grant date 
with a low closing stock price reduces the option’s exercise price and increases its 
value, although the increase in value is less than the reduction in the reduction in the 
strike price.  See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and 
Observations on the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L.REV. 561 (2007). 
168 See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Apple’s Gore, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 
2007, at A16 (suggesting that “if employees are as prone to fallacious thinking as the 
media in valuing options packages, their delight in ‘in the money’ options allowed 
them to be taken to the cleaners….”).   
169 See Brian J. Hall, The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock 
Options 32 (NBER Working Paper No. 6674, Aug. 1998) (finding a “bias toward 
valuing options according [to] what they would be worth if exercised today”). 
170 On the salience bias, see generally A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, 
Availability: a Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSY. 
207 (1973). 
171 Under the pricing assumptions used throughout this article, the ATM 
option would have a value of $39.31/option share; the $90 strike option would have a 
value of $42.96/option share. 
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no more than the strike price of the ATM option.172  Presumably, at 
some degree of discounting, employees would reframe options as stock 
and the mental link back to ATM option value would be severed.   
 If employee preferences for option discounts are respected like any 
other compensation feature providing utility, harnessing this exuberance 
might be seen as a win-win for employees and employers.  Of course, a 
paternalistic regulator conceivably might be concerned about firms 
exploiting employees by paying them with discounted options, but I am 
skeptical that this story explains rules discouraging discounted options 
for two reasons.  First, it is unlikely that regulators would be aware of 
the potential irrational exuberance.  Second, even if they were aware of 
the issue, regulators are unlikely to feel a strong paternalistic need to 
protect the well educated and highly compensated employees and 
executives in the U.S., who typically receive options, from making poor 
choices regarding the form of their compensation. 
  
 
V.  THE EFFICIENCY COST OF DISTORTED COMPENSATION 
ARRANGEMENTS  
 
 
Rules discouraging firms from granting ITM options distort 
compensation design and may reduce the efficiency of corporate 
compensation arrangements.173  It is difficult to quantify the efficiency 
loss, but this part considers the distortion issue qualitatively by 
considering two factors that affect the potential cost of the distortion: 1) 
the adequacy of combinations of ATM options and restricted stock as 
“second best” substitutes for ITM options and 2) the likelihood that U.S. 
firms would issue ITM options but for the tax and former accounting 
rules.   
                                                 
172 Suppose, for example, that the stock’s market value at grant is $100/share.  
The difference in strike price between an ATM option and restricted stock would be 
$100/share.  Assuming the employee values the ATM option positively and the stock at 
$100/share, her subjective difference in valuation must be less than $100/share. 
173 Distortions are not necessarily welfare reducing.  A legal rule that distorts 
private contracts and compensates for market failure can increase social welfare.  
Moreover, according to the theory of second best, in the presence of a market failure, 
we cannot be sure that eliminating one distortion in a market, which does not totally 
eliminate the market failure, will enhance social welfare.  See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin 
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUDIES 11 (1956).  
Many scholars have argued that the market for executive talent, at least, is not perfectly 
competitive because directors are imperfect agents of shareholders in bargaining with 
senior executives.  See, e.g., Bebchuk et al, supra note 41; BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra 
note 41.  Thus, we cannot be certain that an additional distortion related to executive 
compensation, even if not specifically justified as overcoming an externality or market 
failure, is welfare reducing.  However, labor markets below the senior executive level 
should be competitive.  To this extent, at least, distortion in compensation design is 
likely to be efficiency reducing.  
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A.  The Transmutability of Synthetic and Explicitly Discounted Options 
 
The efficiency cost of any distortion in compensation design 
resulting from tax or accounting rules discouraging explicitly discounted 
options is limited if combinations of ATM options and restricted stock, 
which are not discouraged, serve as a close substitute.  And as a matter 
of pure economics, these instruments are largely transmutable.  A firm 
can roughly approximate the incentive effects of an explicitly discounted 
option with a combination of conventional time-vested restricted stock 
and a non-discounted option.  The first part of this section explores how 
these replications may be accomplished and discusses the limitations on 
replication.  Afterwards, I consider details of stock and option design 
that tend to limit transmutability as well as the possibility, noted above, 
that explicitly discounted options might be more attractive to recipients 
than their economics would suggest.  This irrational exuberance 
probably could not be replicated through combinations of stock and non-
discounted options. 
 
1.  The Economics of Synthetic and Explicitly Discounted Options  
 
One cannot perfectly replicate the economics of an ITM option with 
a combination of an ATM option and conventional restricted stock, but 
there are innumerable ways of approximating replication.174  I will focus 
here on a method that equalizes the grant date value of the compensation 
packages as well as the sensitivity of pay to stock price movement at 
grant as measured by option “delta”. 
 When economists analyze the incentive effects of options, they use 
the concept of option delta.  Delta refers to the rate of change in an 
option’s value, and its price if the option is traded, relative to a small 
change in value of the underlying shares.175  Put another way, the delta 
of an option indicates the number of shares that one must hold to 
duplicate or offset the price risk exposure of the option at any given 
                                                 
174 To see the difficulty with perfect replication, note that the payoff of an 
option is zero unless the market price of the underlying shares exceeds the strike price 
at exercise.  The payoff on restricted stock, however, is always positive as long as the 
underlying shares have some value.  Thus, any combination of stock and an ATM 
option will have value as long as the underlying stock has value, whereas an ITM 
option will be worthless as long as the share price is below the strike price. 
Near perfect replication could be accomplished utilizing performance-vested 
restricted stock that vests all or in part depending solely on the future stock price.  
However, this type of vesting condition is never observed, and thus I will limit my 
analysis to the more realistic case of conventional time-vested restricted stock.   
175 See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 344 (6th 
ed. 2006). 
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 48
time.  Although delta is most commonly used in hedging traded options, 
it provides a useful tool for evaluating employee options as well.176 
 Two other introductory comments about option delta will be helpful.  
First, option delta is dynamic.177  As the underlying share price changes, 
as the option moves in or out of the money, the delta moves as well.  
Traders who seek to hedge option positions must regularly buy or sell 
shares to manage their exposure.178  Second, the delta of restricted stock 
– the zero strike price option – is 1.0.179  This makes sense.  If one 
wished to hedge a short position in one share of stock, one would 
purchase a single share of stock. 
 Ideally, then, in order to replicate an explicit ITM option with a 
combination of restricted stock and an ATM option, one would select 
the combination that had the same BSM value and the same delta as the 
explicitly discounted option.  However, there is no combination of stock 
and non-discounted option that provides the same delta as an explicitly 
discounted option over all potential stock prices.  The dynamic nature of 
delta dooms the attempt.  Nonetheless, there is a unique combination of 
stock and an ATM option that has the same BSM value and delta at 
grant as any ITM option, and this combination provides a fairly close 
approximation of the economics of the discounted option. 
 Let us assume, for example, that we wish to replicate a 25% 
discounted option on stock with grant date value of $100/share using a 
combination of an ATM option and restricted stock.180  Under the same 
assumptions I used in Part III in valuing options, the BSM value of this 
discounted option is $49.30/option share.181  Its delta at grant is 0.835.182  
In other words, at the moment of grant, holding 0.835 shares of stock 
would create the same exposure as holding one 25% discounted option 
share.  Under the same assumptions, the BSM value of an ATM option 
is $39.30/option share and its delta at grant is 0.738.  A share of 
restricted stock at the same point would be valued at $100/share and 
would have a delta of 1.0.  Because the deltas of the instruments in a 
portfolio are additive,183 we can determine the replicating package of 
stock and ATM option with a little algebra.  In this case, a combination 
of 0.99 ATM option shares and 0.10 shares of restricted stock have the 
                                                 
176 See, e.g., John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-
Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 268-270 (2001) (using option delta as the 
measure of employee option incentives). 
177 See HULL, supra note 175, at 345. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 The explicit ITM option would have an exercise price of $75/share. 
181 Those assumptions are: $100/share grant date stock value, 35% stock price 
volatility, 6 years to option exercise, a risk free interest rate of 3%, and no dividends.   
182 Option deltas were determined using the calculator found at 
http://www.option-price.com/. 
183 See HULL, supra note 175, at 345. 
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same BSM value and delta at grant as a 25% discounted option on a 
single share.184   
 The following figure presents the payoff profiles of four equal value 
compensation instruments – the explicitly discounted option, the 
combination of ATM option and stock that provides the same delta at 
grant, and, for comparison, an ATM option and deferred stock alone. 185   
 
  
 The slopes of the various lines in this figure represent the sensitivity 
of pay to stock price performance.  As the figure illustrates, per dollar of 
compensation cost, ATM options provide the highest powered 
incentives of this group – the sharpest increase in pay for a given 
increase in share price – at least over the range of stock prices equal to 
the grant date price and above.  Deferred stock provides the least pay-
for-performance sensitivity.  The synthetic and explicitly discounted 
options provide similar pay-for-performance sensitivity that is 
intermediate to that of deferred stock or ATM options alone.   
 And this is the primary point to this analysis: not that firms can 
perfectly replicate ITM options through combinations of deferred stock 
and ATM options, but that the two approaches can be used to provide 
similar incentives, which suggests that synthetic ITM options may 
provide a reasonably close substitute for explicit ITM options, from an 
                                                 
184 See Appendix. 
185 Because the “premiums” paid for compensatory stock or options take the 
form of reductions in other compensation, which are unobservable, these payoff 
diagrams focus solely on the value received by the participant at settlement. 
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optimal contracting standpoint.186  However, this rather abstract view of 
the transmutability of explicit and synthetic ITM options is to some 
extent tempered by differences in details of stock and option design 
discussed in the next subsection and by differences in employee 
perceptions discussed in the following subsection. 
 
2. Differences in Stock and Option Design that Affect 
Transmutability 
 
 The devil, of course, is always in the details, and several details 
regarding the design of conventional stock and option compensation 
undermines transmutability.  These design features are not cast in stone, 
but there is undoubtedly inertia behind these conventional features. 
  
a.  The Timing of Stock Vesting and Option Exercise 
 
 The analysis in this part has been based on a simplifying assumption 
of European options (options that may be exercised only on a single, 
pre-specified date) which are exercisable, if at all, on the same date that 
the restricted stock vests.  In reality, U.S. compensatory stock options 
are Bermudan.187  They cannot be exercised prior to vesting, and, in 
some cases, exercise may be proscribed during certain black-out periods, 
but otherwise they may be exercised at any point between vesting and 
expiration at the holder’s discretion.  Expiration, typically, is on the 
tenth anniversary of the date of grant.  Clearly, the ability to time the 
exercise of an option provides value to the holder that cannot be 
replicated through deferred stock.188   
 However, the difference is not as important as one might think.  
Vesting patterns for stock and option grants tend to be similar,189 and the 
                                                 
186 As I have noted, the deltas of the synthetic and explicit ITM options will 
not track over time.  If, for example, the share price doubles to $200, the delta of the 
explicit ITM option would be 0.963, while the delta of the combination grant would be 
1.017.  If the stock fell to $50/share, the delta of the explicit ITM option would be 
0.566, while the combination grant’s delta would be 0.529. 
187 U.S. employee stock options are often referred to as American options, but 
technically an American option may be exercised at any point between the grant of the 
option and expiration.  U.S. employee stock options are a hybrid of European and 
American options, hence Bermudan. 
188 Stock can obviously be held past vesting as well, but holding stock entails 
greater downside risk than holding an option.  Thus, all else being equal, one would 
expect options to be held longer than stock. 
189 A recent study of executive compensation practices at the 250 largest 
companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index found that 96% of stock options and 
95% of restricted stock grants vested in three to five years.  Although options were 
more likely than stock grants to vest in installments, the distribution of vesting periods 
was quite similar.  See FREDERICK W. COOK & CO., supra note 21, at 14.   
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evidence indicates that optionees routinely sacrifice option value by 
exercising the instruments well before expiration.190   
 
b.  IRC § 83(b) Elections 
 
 I have assumed throughout that recipients of restricted stock do not 
make § 83(b) elections.  If this election is made, stock compensation is 
taxed at grant, based on its grant date fair market value, ignoring the 
restriction on transferability prior to vesting.  Gains or losses going 
forward are capital gains or losses.  At first blush, the election might 
seem advisable for a bullish employee in receipt of restricted stock.  
Recognizing a small amount of ordinary income at grant and 
establishing a low basis would convert ordinary income into capital 
gain.  But for two reasons public company employees rarely make 
§ 83(b) elections.  First, if they do, and if they forfeit the stock prior to 
vesting, the tax paid is not recoverable.191  Second, public company 
employees can generally purchase shares outside of compensation plans.  
If their bullish prediction is correct and the stock appreciates, they will 
be better off deferring the tax on the restricted stock grant by forgoing 
the § 83(b) election and investing the deferred tax in more shares.192 
 On the other hand, bullish employees of private companies, who 
often cannot purchase shares outside of compensation plans, might 
reasonably choose to make the election, particularly if they are relatively 
confident that they will remain with the company through vesting.193  In 
these situations, the possibility of a § 83(b) election with respect to 
stock, but not options, reduces the similarity between explicit ITM 
options and packages of stock and non-discounted options. 
 
c.  Other Differences 
  
 There are other important differences between stock and option 
grants that affect the transmutability of explicit and synthetic discounted 
options.  As Dean Schizer has shown, executives can readily hedge 
restricted stock grants in the period between grant and vesting, whereas 
tax and securities laws make it much more difficult and costly for 
executives to hedge their exposure to options.194  Holders of restricted 
stock receive dividends; option holders are not generally entitled to 
dividends, although executive stock option plans sometimes include 
                                                 
190 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.   
191 See IRC § 83(b) (clarifying that an individual making a § 83(b) election 
cannot subsequently claim a deduction if the property is forfeited). 
192 See David I. Walker, Market Symmetry and the Tax Efficiency of Equity 
Compensation (Working Paper). 
193 See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital 
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 
(2003).  
194 See Schizer, supra note 141. 
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“dividend protection,” which economically approximates dividend 
rights.195  Restricted shares may be voted in shareholder elections; 
options provide no voting rights.196  
 
3.  Employee Attitudes towards Explicit and Synthetic Discounted 
Options 
 
 As discussed in Part IV.C, as a result of a salience bias, employees 
may perceive explicitly discounted options to be more valuable than 
economically equivalent packages of non-discounted options and 
restricted stock.  Differences in perceived value would make it costlier 
for firms to substitute packages of non-discounted options and stock for 
explicitly discounted options.  Of course, this difference has independent 
normative implications.  We may legitimately disregard a “cost” 
associated with reduced exploitation of employees.   
 
B. Would U.S. Firms Issue ITM Options but for the Tax and Accounting 
Rules Discouraging Them? 
 
It is clear from the data reviewed in Part II.B that there is significant 
demand for ITM pay packages at U.S. public companies.  This does not 
mean, however, that in the absence of regulatory barriers, firms would 
simplify compensation plans and reduce administrative costs by 
replacing combinations of stock and non-discounted options with 
explicitly discounted options.  Why not?  One reason would be that the 
irrational exuberance of employees in favor of discounted options might 
well be matched by irrational outrage on the part of investors and the 
financial press.  We are all susceptible to the salience bias, and it might 
be difficult for firms to convince investors that discounted options 
represented optimal compensation, rather than a giveaway to employees.  
Given that risk, firms might logically decide to continue granting 
relatively low-outrage packages of non-discounted options and stock, at 
least to senior executives whose pay is most visible and outrage-
inducing, even if there was some loss of efficiency.197 
                                                 
195 See Murphy, supra note 15, at 2510 (noting that the most common form of 
dividend protection is the payment of accumulated dividends plus interest on option 
exercise). 
196 Of course, performance shares, which are equivalent economically to 
restricted stock, are non-voting prior to settlement, just like options. 
197 Consider out-of-the-money options.  There are no tax or other regulatory 
barriers to issuing these options, but they are observed almost as rarely as ITM options.  
Why?  Perhaps they are rarely optimal.  Perhaps just as employees would tend to 
overvalue a strike price discount, they might overestimate the cost to them of a strike 
price premium.  But another possibility, put forward by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, 
and myself, is that the ATM line might represent an investor outrage sweet spot for 
executive stock options.  If discounted options draw fire, while firms receive little 
credit from investors for issuing premium options, the ratio of option value to investor 
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It is a difficult proposition to assess.  One might look elsewhere in 
the world to see whether discounted options are prevalent, but 
relationships between directors and shareholders of U.S. firms are 
somewhat unique, and, moreover, one would find that the U.S. is not 
alone in discouraging explicitly discounted options.  Thus, this 
international inquiry might not be as fruitful as it might appear at first 
blush.198     
 
 
VI.  ALTERNATIVE POLICY RESPONSES 
 
 
 Current U.S. tax rules all but preclude explicitly discounted 
employee stock options.  These rules limit preferential option tax 
treatment to the class of instruments for which that treatment is most 
justified – non-discounted options – but the rules potentially distort 
compensation design and may result in less efficient compensation 
arrangements.  This part briefly explores two alternative tax regimes that 
could reduce the distortion – 1) modification of § 409A, § 162(m), and 
the ISO rules to eliminate the ITM/ATM option distinction, combined 
with bifurcation of explicitly discounted options for tax purposes, and 2) 
                                                                                                                            
outrage may be maximized by issuing ATM options.  See Bebchuk et al, supra note 41; 
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 41.   
198 Discounted options are observed in the U.K., but following the 1995 
Greenbury Report on best practices for corporate governance, they appear to have been 
limited to non-executive employees.  See DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A 
STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD GREENBURY, 17 (1995) (providing, without 
elaboration, that “executive share options should never be issued at a discount”); 
MARTIN J. CONYON & CHRIS MALLIN, DIRECTOR’S SHARE OPTIONS, PERFORMANCE 
CRITERIA AND DISCLOSURE: COMPLIANCE WITH THE GREENBURY REPORT 47 (1997) 
(providing data indicating that non-executive options issued by FTSE 100 and Mid 250 
firms in the mid-1990s were granted with mean discounts of about 19%, while 
executive options were issued with no discounts, but noting that prior to the Greenbury 
report many executive options were issued at the money); Konstantinos Stathopoulos et 
al., U.K. Executive Compensation Practices: New Economy versus Old Economy, 16 J. 
MGMT. ACCT. RES. 57, 77 (2004) (finding that a “substantial portion” of options issued 
to U.K. retailing employees were issued at a considerable discount). 
In Germany, the stock corporation act restricts stock option discounting.  See 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS IN THE EU AND THE USA: 
GERMANY ¶ 2.9 (2002).  Moreover, tax rules in Belgium, France, Ireland, and Italy 
(formerly) discourage ITMOs.  See Francesco Cohen et al., Employee Stock Options: 
Italy and the World, 44 TAX NOTES INT’L 928, 965, 969-70 (Dec. 18, 2006) (describing 
former and current Italian tax rules and briefly outlining rules applicable in France and 
Ireland); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS IN THE EU AND THE 
USA: OVERVIEW (2002) (noting that discounted options in Belgium are subject to 
social security tax).  Canadian income tax rules strongly discourage discounted options.  
Employees receiving non-discounted options effectively pay tax on gains at exercise at 
capital gains rates as the result of a special tax deduction.  That deduction is not 
available with respect to discounted options, the gains on which would be taxed as 
ordinary income.   See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th supp.) § 110(1)(d) (Can.).   
DISCOUNTED EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 
 
 54
maintaining a bright line rule, but shifting the break point between 
permissible and impermissible options.  
  
A.  Bifurcating Discounted Options for Tax Purposes 
 
 Of course, one could eliminate the distortion in option design created 
by § 409A, § 162(m), and the ISO rules by modifying these rules to treat 
discounted options on a par with non-discounted options.  However, as 
we have seen, making this change in isolation would permit firms to 
issue deeply discounted options that resemble restricted stock 
economically, but that would be taxed at exercise rather than at vesting.  
In my view, much more evidence of costly distortion would be needed 
to justify such a change. 
 Suppose, however, that the tax rules were modified as suggested but 
that options granted in the money were bifurcated for tax purposes into a 
simple combination of restricted stock and an ATM option.  This 
approach would eliminate the current discontinuous tax treatment and 
put explicitly discounted options back on the table.  However, to be at 
all manageable, the bifurcation would have to be much simpler than the 
replication discussed in Part V.  Let’s suppose the new rule bifurcated 
ITM option shares into restricted stock and ATM option shares based 
simply on the percentage by which the actual option was in the money at 
grant.  For example, an option granted with a $75 strike price on shares 
worth $100 at grant would be treated for tax purposes as 0.25 shares of 
restricted stock and 0.75 shares of an ATM option.  Going forward, the 
employee would recognize income on the deemed restricted stock 
portion at vesting regardless of whether the option was actually in, at, or 
out of the money at that time.199  At option exercise, if that were to 
occur, the employee would recognize income based on the deemed 
exercise price of the ATM option.  If the option expired unexercised, the 
employee would be entitled to reverse the ordinary income recognized 
when the deemed restricted stock vested. 
 Although such an approach would be complex, it would eliminate 
the current discontinuity in tax treatment of options and allow firms 
wishing to grant ITM pay packages to choose between explicitly 
discounted options bifurcated for tax purposes and pay packages 
actually bifurcated into ATM options and restricted stock.  Given the 
complexity of this approach, however, as well as the possibility of 
taxable income arising from the deemed restricted stock in cases in 
which options are underwater at vesting,200 I would suspect that most 
                                                 
199 Presumably, the employee would also be entitled to make a § 83(b) election 
with respect to the deemed stock portion at grant. 
200 Suppose, for example, that the firm’s stock was trading at $50/share when the 
hypothesized option vested.  The $75 strike option would be unexercisable, but the 
employee would be forced to recognize income of $12.50 per option share ($50/share x 
.25 shares) on the deemed restricted stock. 
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firms would continue granting both stock and non-discounted options 
rather than granting explicitly discounted options under this tax regime. 
 
B.  A More Lenient Bright Line Rule 
 
 If one believed that the efficiency cost of the distortions created by 
the current tax distinctions between discounted and non-discounted 
options was serious, but perhaps only slightly greater than the benefits 
resulting from preventing the preferential option tax regime from 
extending to instruments resembling restricted stock, one might favor 
maintaining the current approach of using the tax rules to take certain 
options off the table, but shifting the line between permitted and 
prohibited discounts from zero to something greater than zero, call it 
X%.  This modification would be simple to draft and simple to 
understand.  NQSOs discounted up to X% would be taxed consistently 
with non-discounted NQSOs and would satisfy the § 162(m) safe 
harbor.  ISOs could be discounted up to X%, as well, or one could 
maintain the current break point for ISOs or NQSOs and shift the break 
point for the other tax regime.  Options discounted further than X% 
would be taxed at vesting and subject to the 20% penalty tax of § 409A, 
would not satisfy the § 162(m) safe harbor, and/or would not qualify as 
ISOs. 
 If the existing tax rules produce efficiency costs, a move in this 
direction would reduce them, but, of course, it would also expand the 
reach of one or both of the preferential option tax regimes.  Although it 
seems unlikely that the current at-the-money break point is optimal, it is 
not obvious that any other arbitrary break point – 25% discount, 50% 
discount, or even 25% premium – would be superior.  Nothing we have 
seen suggests anything other than continuous, monotonic relationships. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In my assessment, curtailing the ability of firms and employees to 
achieve the tax deferral and timing control associated with NQSOs and 
ISOs for deeply discounted options that resemble stock awards is the 
most compelling argument for rules discouraging grants of explicitly 
discounted options.  I am not convinced that the incremental threat to the 
public fisc of expanding NQSO & ISO taxation to stock grants is terribly 
serious, although I would view such expansion as a move in the wrong 
direction.   
 Moreover, while one could certainly criticize § 409A’s 20% penalty 
tax on discounted options as being an excessive and uncalibrated 
response – taking discounted options off the table entirely rather than 
treating and taxing them as part of a continuum – at this stage of the 
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analysis it is not clear that the efficiency cost of forcing firms to 
bifurcate in-the-money pay packages into combinations of non-
discounted options and stock is all that great.  Given the additional 
wildcard of unpredictable subjective valuation of explicitly discounted 
options, which is unlikely to add to social welfare, it is not obvious that 
relaxing the current bright line rules or replacing them with more 
nuanced regulation is desirable.      
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APPENDIX 
 
 
1.  OVERVIEW OF CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF EQUITY 
COMPENSATION201 
 
Type of 
Instrument 
Time of 
Employee 
Inclusion
Character of 
Employee 
Tax
Employer 
Deduction? 
Restricted 
stock 
Vesting is 
default, but 
employee can 
elect taxation 
on grant date.  
IRC § 83. 
Ordinary 
income. 
Yes, when 
employee 
includes in 
income.  IRC 
§ 83.* 
Non-qualified 
stock options 
and stock 
appreciation 
rights (non-
discounted) 
Option 
exercise.  IRC 
§ 83.   
Ordinary 
income. 
Yes, when 
employee 
includes in 
income.   IRC 
§ 83. 
Non-qualified 
stock options 
and stock 
appreciation 
rights 
(discounted) 
Vesting.  IRC 
§ 409A. 
Ordinary 
income + 20% 
penalty tax. 
Yes, when 
employee 
includes in 
income.  IRC 
§ 83.* 
Incentive 
stock 
options** 
Sale of 
underlying 
stock.  IRC 
§ 421(a). 
Capital gain.  
IRC §§ 1221, 
1222. 
No.  IRC 
§ 421(a). 
 
 
* Subject to limitations of IRC § 162(m). 
** Discounted options do not qualify as ISOs.  IRC § 422(b). 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
201 I thank Leandra Lederman for suggesting the inclusion of this table in the appendix. 
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2.  BSM AND INITIAL DELTA EQUIVALENT ITM OPTION REPLICATION   
 
 Under the pricing assumptions listed in note x, supra, the BSM 
values and grant date deltas of the instruments considered in Part V.A.1 
are as follows:  
 
    ATM Option    25% ITM Option Rest. Stock 
 BSM Value    $39.3        $49.3     $100 
 Initial Delta    .738         .835    1.0 
 
 The combination of shares of restricted stock (x) and ATM options 
shares (y) that has the same BSM value and initial delta as the 25% ITM 
option is determined as follows: 
 
 100x + 39.3y = 49.3. 
 1x + .738y = .835. 
 
 Solving the equations yields x = .103, y = .991. 
 
 
 
